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PRIVATE REQUITALS 
BAILEY KUKLIN* 
ABSTRACT 
Previously, I examined the establishment of a person’s substantive rights and, 
correlatively, duties. But this was only the first step. This Article addresses the 
second step: the means for recognizing requital rights violations, including their 
articulation, adoption, and implementation. Taking a deontic, individualistic 
perspective on rights, this Article aims to delineate and protect one’s personal 
freedom, one’s autonomy. To do so, this Article, using a formal understanding of the 
categorical imperative, will examine whether an agent’s chosen maxims are 
deontically acceptable. The maxims need to be both first-order, substantive ones that 
establish autonomy boundary baselines, and second-order, requital ones that address 
violations of the baselines. Important elements in perhaps all maxims, both first- and 
second-order, are the notions of harm, wrongfulness, and blameworthiness. Once an 
agent’s substantive and requital maxims are properly in place and honored, she is 
truly in a position to be an autonomous person. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“You can’t do that to me. I’ll sue! I’ve got my rights!” Versions of this plea, 
demand, threat, commonly begin the myriad of disputes that end up in litigation. 
Implicit in this complaint are a series of questions that must be resolved before the 
accuser can obtain relief, including: What are a person’s rights? How are they 
established? What remedies are available for rights violations? How are these 
correctives instituted?  
In a prior article, I addressed the first two of these questions regarding the 
establishment of a person’s substantive rights and, correlatively, duties.1 Taking a 
deontic, individualistic perspective on rights, I detailed the process by which an 
agent adopts a scheme of substantive rights and duties for herself and, under the 
universalization mandate of Kant’s categorical imperative, for everyone else. But 
this was only the first step. The scheme is not fully in place until the means for 
recognizing requitals for rights violations is also articulated, adopted, and 
implemented. Picking up some pieces of this process mentioned in the prior article, 
aspects of this second step are the primary focus of this Article.  
The continued quest in this Article for the delineation and protection of one’s 
realm of freedom, one’s autonomy, begins with a brief examination of the meanings 
of autonomy. To judge whether an agent’s chosen maxims are deontically 
acceptable, I invoke as the standard a formal understanding of the categorical 
imperative, as do most other commentators. Under this understanding, the requisites 
of acceptable maxims are broadly framed; it is up to each agent to adopt material 
principles that fit within this framework. The maxims need to be both first-order, 
substantive ones that establish autonomy boundary baselines, and second-order, 
requital ones that address violations of the baselines. With a few exceptions an 
agent’s consent allows for the adjustment of her established baselines. In drawing 
these boundaries the agent aims to balance her liberty and security interests. 
Important elements in perhaps all maxims, both first- and second-order, are the 
notions of harm, wrongfulness, and blameworthiness. For requitals in private law, 
corrective justice is the standard gauge. For public, criminal law, it is retribution. 
Much of this Article constitutes a survey of the range of plausible maxims for 
consideration by an agent. Since substantive and requital maxims are typically 
deeply intertwined, as a matter of expediency I sometimes dwell upon the 
substantive maxims rather than their requital complements. The substantive ones 
tend to spark more controversy. Among the normative topics examined are 
intentional harmful conduct, truth telling and promise keeping, reliance and 
expectations, exploitation, risk imposition, and existing social norms. Once an 
agent’s substantive and requital maxims are properly in place and honored, she is 
truly in a position to be an autonomous person.  
I. AUTONOMY 
In a deontic regime, personal autonomy is of paramount moment. An 
autonomous person is, in a nutshell, one who is self-governed.2 Metaphorically, she 
controls an autonomy space in which she is free to act without interference from 
others. Personal autonomy, however, is not a pre-existing condition protected by 
                                                            
 1  See Bailey Kuklin, Constructing Autonomy, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 375 (2015). 
 2  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE 214 (2009); Kuklin, supra note 1, at 385-86.  
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legal and moral norms. To the contrary, legal and moral norms are what establish the 
parameters of personal autonomy by consensually circumscribing a moral agent’s 
realm of freedom. This freedom entails a balancing of two interrelated interests: the 
liberty to choose one’s conduct without interference from others; and, the security 
from interference by other people’s choices or conduct.3 These two interests are 
often in tension. The expansion of one person’s liberty curtails other people’s 
security, and vice versa.4  
We can distinguish different types or degrees of autonomy space. At one end of 
the spectrum is hypothetical autonomy space.5 This approaches an ideal in which an 
agent has all the necessary resources, external and internal, to engage in whatever 
acceptable conduct she chooses.6 Somewhat more limited, except for the occasional 
Midas or demigod, is formal autonomy space.7 An agent’s freedom here is limited in 
principle only by the established legal and moral norms, though in practice her 
resources may prevent her from exercising various avenues within this space, as 
where a person is financially unable to purchase a desired yacht. At the far end of the 
spectrum, possibly, is material autonomy space.8 An agent’s actual resources 
circumscribe this. An impecunious, homeless person, for example, has a material 
autonomy space that is very constricted in practice. These three notions of autonomy 
space offer different perspectives of an agent’s freedom. In addressing an agent’s 
claims to autonomy and establishing her proper requitals for autonomy invasions, 
these perspectives become relevant. For example, does respect for another’s 
autonomy require the provision of a minimal level of resources (e.g., welfare) to 
ensure that an agent’s material autonomy space suffices for her to engage in a 
substantial range of quotidian activities? Is the discriminatory refusal to sell a yacht 
to another person because of her ethnicity a remediable autonomy invasion if she did 
not have the resources to make the purchase in any case? Is retributive punishment to 
account for the fact that the autonomy space of a Midas is materially constricted to a 
much greater degree by a particular jail sentence than is the case of an equal sentence 
for an impoverished agent?  
In working out the proper reach of an agent’s autonomy space, Kant’s categorical 
imperative grounds today’s dominant mechanism for gauging a proper balance 
between liberty and security.9 This imperative declares that each person, by virtue of 
her rational capacity, is an ethical being of priceless value whose dignity is entitled 
                                                            
 3  Kuklin, supra note 1, at 380-81. 
 4  Id. at 386-87. When we are nearby, the greater my liberty to swing my fist as I please, 
the less is your security from being assaulted or battered. 
 5  Id. at 409. 
 6  Id. at 409-10. 
 7  Id. at 410-11. 
 8  Id. at 412-13. 
 9  See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 353, 
393 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (1797) [hereinafter KANT, 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS] (“Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s 
choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a 
universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity.”).  
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to respect by others.10 As a moral agent, one has the right to be respected by others 
and the duty to respect other moral agents.11 A formal, strongly individualistic 
understanding of this declaration, which I embrace here, implies that each person has 
the freedom to choose her own maxims of conduct to balance her perceived interests 
in liberty and security. Under one form of the categorical imperative, each maxim 
must be universalizable.12 It must apply equally to both the maxim adopter and to 
everyone else. Otherwise, a lack of allotted equality implies an improper lack of 
respect. Yet universalization must be distinguished from generalization. A 
universalized maxim may apply to a restrict range of persons (e.g., family or 
coworkers) or situations (e.g., snowboarding), or it may apply very generally (e.g., 
charity).13 
As a matter of logic and functionality, an agent’s chosen maxims must constitute 
a complete and coherent set that resolves any potential conflicts among them. 
Because each person’s set of individual maxims may be inconsistent with those of 
others, as a practical matter there must be a means to resolve these differences and 
coordinate behavior. Yet, from an individualistic perspective, one should be bound 
to maxims only of one’s own choosing.14 Kant, astutely, did not push his 
individualistic foundation this far. He invoked a nonconsensual social contract as a 
synchronizing device.15 Modern Kantians, including John Rawls, tend to rely upon a 
social contract founded on a weak or fictional form of consent, such as tacit or 
hypothetical agreement, or on concepts such as fairness.16 This central, controversial 
issue I leave to others.17 For purposes of this Article, I accept that a properly deontic 
state and community are the arbiters of norms. They should, of course, embrace my 
guidance.  
With the above preliminaries in mind, a rational, autonomous agent is in a 
position to consider the adoption of maxims. She must first attend to those that 
demarcate substantive rights and duties. These focus on the underlying balance 
between basic liberty and security interests. She must also attend to requital maxims 
                                                            
 10  “[A] human being regarded as a person . . . is [ ] to be valued . . . as an end in itself, that 
is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself 
from all other rational beings in the world.” Id. at 186. 
 11  Kuklin, supra note 1, at 383-84. 
 12  Id. at 390. 
 13  See id. at 421-23; infra note 132.  
 14  For further elaboration of this basic framework, see Kuklin, supra note 1, at 383-93.  
 15  See KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9, at 451, 457-59; ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, 
FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 198-204 (2001); JOHN 
RAWLS, Justice as Fairness, in COLLECTED PAPERS 47, 71 n.22 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) 
(Kant “interpreted the original contract merely as an ‘Idea of Reason’”). 
 16  See generally BRIAN SKYRMS, EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1996); Fred 
D’Agostino et al., Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism-contemporary/ (last visited May 8, 
2016). 
 17  I duck this issue as one of the most intractable in all of political theory. None of the 
current theories to resolve it are fully satisfactory, in my view, in an individualistic, deontic 
realm.  
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss4/7
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that respond to violations of the substantive maxims. The consequences of violations 
must be established to fully flesh out one’s autonomy space, one’s range of freedom.  
In adopting substantive maxims, an agent will naturally consider harms that 
conduct may engender. For if conduct does not produce any harms, there is no 
apparent reason to challenge the agent’s liberty to engage in it. When harms do 
ensue, the security interests of those impacted come to bear. But some harms are 
typically not seen as wrongful. For example, in capitalistic societies the harms that 
ensue from fair business practices are not considered unjust, nor are those that arise 
from the common, inevitable bumps into others on crowded sidewalks. Though 
harms, these are not legally cognizable injuries. Theoreticians often embrace a “harm 
principle” to distinguish sanctionable harms from others.18 Physical, psychic, and 
economic harms are the three standard types that receive extensive protection under 
current law.19 A fourth type of harm, which often flies below the radar of existing 
legal and moral norms, is dignitary harm. In my view, to the contrary, dignitary harm 
should get pride of place in the deontic realm we are exploring.20 Priceless individual 
dignity is the bedrock of the categorical imperative. Disrespect of that dignity is a 
paramount instance of an autonomy invasion.21  
For the establishment of requital maxims, a sophisticated modern agent is likely 
to turn to Aristotle and Kant. In the context of private law, Aristotle’s concept of 
corrective justice holds sway.22 In public, criminal law, retribution, championed by 
Kant, predominates.23 Both of these concepts will be discussed below.  
As suggested by the basic deontic principles already introduced, several key, 
sometimes nebulous, essentially contested concepts are likely to require meticulous 
delineation, including: dignity, respect, autonomy, liberty, security, and harm. 
Another similarly contestable concept, blameworthiness, is central to most current 
discussions of fair responsibility. This concept is of particular concern in this Article. 
Short of absolute or strict liability, if such are acceptable, blameworthiness is 
connected to most, if not all, legal and moral principles of interest.24 
Blameworthiness in a deontic regime has, as I see it, two important aspects, each 
with two prongs. First, as Aristotle advances, there is “responsibility 
blameworthiness.”25 An agent is not responsible for her choices and conduct insofar 
as they are a product of ignorance or coercion.26 Such a choice or conduct is not a 
fully free one. It is not fair to hold one liable for unavoidably unforeseeable or forced 
                                                            
 18  See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 10-14, 26-27 (1988); JOHN STUART MILL, 
On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 81, 176-200 
(1869); Kuklin, supra note 1, at 416-19. 
 19  See generally Kuklin, supra note 1, at 429-45.  
 20  Id. 
 21  Id. 
 22  Id. at 381. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. 
 25  Id. at 446-47. 
 26  See ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935, 964, 
1015-16 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941).  
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outcomes.27 Both prongs, ignorance and coercion, may be a product of sources or 
forces that are internal or external to the agent, or a combination of the two. For 
instance, internal ignorance may stem from cognitive dissonance or self-deception, 
while internal coercion may come from insanity, impulse, or akrasia. External 
ignorance may ensue from fraud or deception, while external coercion may result 
from physical constraint or economic pressure. 
Second, as manifest in Kant’s categorical imperative, there is “disrespect 
blameworthiness.”28 The two prongs of this form of blameworthiness are, first, a 
disrespectful attitude towards another agent (e.g., a personal sense of moral 
superiority) and, second, a disrespectful treatment of another agent.29 The denial of 
another’s rights, for example, may be a product of the actor’s belief that the other 
person is inferior (e.g., racial or religious discrimination). Indeed, the disrespectful 
                                                            
 27  Some commentators, unpersuaded by this argument, adopt a principle of “outcome 
responsibility.” This is a form of strict liability. “The idea that those who expose others to 
risks are responsible for the outcomes they cause has considerable appeal. Kant says that those 
who do wrong ‘play a game of chance with the agency of others.’” ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, 
EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 65 (1999); see also ANDREWS REATH, Agency and 
the Imputation of Consequences in Kant’s Ethics, in AGENCY AND AUTONOMY IN KANT’S 
MORAL THEORY 250 (2006). For advocates of strict outcome responsibility, see, for example, 
Peter Cane, Retribution, Proportionality, and Moral Luck in Tort Law, in THE LAW OF 
OBLIGATION 141 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1998); TONY HONORE, Responsibility and 
Luck: The Moral Basis of Strict Liability, in RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 14 (1999). “A variety 
of principles, including non-reciprocity of risk or benefit, protection of legitimate 
expectations, or a Kantian requirement of internalizing externalities, can justify liability for 
non-faulty conduct.” Kenneth W. Simons, Jules Coleman and Corrective Justice in Tort Law: 
A Critique and Reformulation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 862 (1992) (footnotes 
omitted). Responsible agency, under Aristotle, requires sufficient freedom from ignorance and 
coercion, which the strict liability of outcome responsibility may not. Honore contends that, 
“outcome allocation is crucial to our identity as persons . . . .” HONORE, supra, at 27. But, to 
say nothing of coercion, the idea that a person’s identity turns on holding her accountable for 
“unavoidable accidents” from choices made in ignorance of risks (unforeseeability) seems 
weak, counterintuitive. For strong criticism of standard outcome responsibility, see, for 
example, JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW 199 (2006); Stephen Perry, Loss, 
Agency, and Responsibility for Outcomes: Three Conceptions of Corrective Justice, in TORT 
THEORY 24 (Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993); Stephen R. Perry, 
Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF 
TORTS 72 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) [hereinafter, Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes]; 
Christopher H. Schroeder, Causation, Compensation, and Moral Responsibility, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 347 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Allan Beever, 
Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in Tort, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 475, 484-
91 (2008). “In strict liability, the protection of the plaintiff’s right cuts off the defendant’s 
moral power to actualize his or her purposive capacity, so that the vindication of the plaintiff’s 
agency comes at the price of denying the defendant’s.” ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF 
PRIVATE LAW 182-83 (1995). “[T]he theoretical case for basing tort liability on the causation 
of harm without fault is inconsistent with the equality and correlativity of corrective justice 
and with the concept of agency that underlies Kantian right.” Id. at 203.  
 28  Kuklin, supra note 1, at 449-50. 
 29  See, e.g., THOMAS E. HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT’S MORAL 
THEORY 55 (1992); Allen Wood, Humanity as End in Itself, in 2 DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT 
MATTERS 58, 62-63 (2011); Kuklin, supra note 1, at 449-54; Robin S. Dillon, Respect, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/respect (last visited May 8, 2016). 
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attitude alone, even without conduct manifesting it, suffices to abridge the mandate 
to be respectful of others.30 On the other hand, an agent may have the utmost regard 
for another person, but still treat her disrespectfully by denying her a particular right. 
For instance, one might paternalize a stout loved one by nonconsensually hiding her 
sweets to keep her from temptation.  
The mapping of an agent’s autonomy space through the adoption of legal and 
moral maxims, both substantive and requital, entails the establishment of rights and 
duties. Before turning our attention to the establishment of maxims, particularly the 
requital ones of primary interest in this Article, it will be useful to consider the 
nature of rights and duties. 
II. RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
Rights and duties may be negative or positive. Negative rights generally relate to 
the protection of the right-holder’s security.31 Positive rights generally relate to the 
liberty of the right-holder to choose and act.32 In the following section, rights and 
duties that satisfy the categorical imperative are referred to as deontic ones. The 
deontic rights and duties considered here, like the non-deontic ones (e.g., utility 
rights), are treated as Hohfeldian correlatives.33 In this section, I briefly discuss 
rights and duties from two overlapping perspectives: deontic and consensual. 
A. Deontic Rights and Duties 
The source of relevant deontic rights and duties is the maxims within the 
categorical imperative embraced by a moral agent.34 An agent embraces a maxim 
when she chooses, adopts, acts on, or explicitly consents to it. Under the formal 
interpretation of the categorical imperative accepted by most commentators,35 there 
                                                            
 30  Dillon, supra note 29.  
 31  See Gregory C. Keating, A Social Contract Conception of the Tort Law of Accidents, in 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 27, at 22-23.  
 32  For brief summaries of other, associated notions of positive and negative liberty and 
rights, and active and passive ones, see Kuklin supra note 1, at 390-92.  
 33  See WESLEY N. HOHFELD, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 23 (1923). While Hohfeld distinguishes 
claim-right/duty, liberty (privilege)/no-right, power/liability, and immunity/disability, unless 
relevant, I will lump these together as rights and duties. Kant did not see deontic rights and 
duties as Hohfeldian correlatives. For other differences as well between Hohfeld and Kant, see 
Nikolai Lazarev, Hohfeld’s Analysis of Rights: An Essential Approach to a Conceptual and 
Practical Understanding of the Nature of Rights, 12 MURDOCH UNIV. ELECT. J. L. (2005), 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/2005/9.html. For general doubts about the 
correlativity, see, for example, David Lyons, The Correlativity of Rights and Duties, 4 NOÛS 
45, 45 (1970). 
 34  For a discussion of Kant’s notion of duties, see generally ALLEN W. WOOD, KANTIAN 
ETHICS 158-81 (2008).  
 35  Some commentators disagree. “In response to the traditional Hegelian objection that 
[“the universal law version of the Categorical Imperative”] is purely formal and empty of 
content, a number of theorists sympathetic to Kant have ably made the case that [some forms 
of the Categorical Imperative have] important and substantive moral implications.” ANDREWS 
REATH, Agency and Universal Law, in AGENCY AND AUTONOMY IN KANT’S MORAL THEORY, 
supra note 27, at 196, 196 (citing ONORA O’NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON (1989); 
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is no particular maxim that every agent must adopt.36 Unlike Kant’s perfect (narrow) 
obligations from adopted maxims, Kant’s imperfect (wide) obligations do not 
themselves create claims by identifiable individuals.37 These imperfect obligations 
include duties of virtue, such as the duty of general beneficence and self-
development.38 No one can claim a right to another person’s duty of virtue. The duty 
of virtue, then, does not by itself create a Hohfeldian right. An agent, in recognition 
of an imperfect duty, may make a commitment to another person. A promise to make 
a charitable contribution is an example. Once this occurs, the agent’s consent may 
create a correlative right in that other person, as from a maxim of promise keeping, 
unlike the imperfect duty by itself.  
Adopted maxims relate to facets of an agent’s moral realm.39 Initially there are 
substantive, first-order maxims, such as, “do not batter another person.” Then there 
are second-order, requital maxims that stem from conceptions of corrective justice or 
retribution, such as, “one must compensate wrongfully harmed persons to the extent 
of the harm.” These second-order maxims are invoked after there is a violation of 
first-order maxims.40 Together, first- and second-order maxims demarcate a person’s 
                                                            
BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT 6–7, 10 (1993); CHRISTINE 
KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS (1996); JOHN RAWLS, Kant, Lecture II, in 
LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY (2000)); see also, e.g., RIPSTEIN, supra 
note 15, at 383; Arthur Ripstein, Closing the Gap, in 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 61, 86 (2007) 
(“there are some things, such as murder, that the state must define as crimes”).  
 36  See, e.g., THOMAS E. HILL, JR., Pains and Projects: Justifying to Oneself, in AUTONOMY 
AND SELF-RESPECT 173, 178 (1991). “At any given moment there may be and usually are an 
indefinite number of permissible maxims [that are within the Categorical Imperative] on 
which we may act.” ROGER J. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT’S MORAL THEORY 51 (1989). 
 37  See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, in 
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (1785) 
[hereinafter KANT, GROUNDWORK]. 
 38  See, e.g., id. at 41, 53-54, 74-75; KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9, at 
512-40, 572. 
 39  Hurd “distinguish[es] at least five deontological positions (some possessing several 
variations) concerning the objects of categorical imperatives, and hence five possible positions 
concerning the nature of deontological wrongdoing. Put succinctly, the categorical 
imperatives of deontology may prohibit certain (1) motivations, (2) deliberations, (3) 
intentions, (4) tryings, or (5) actions.” Heidi Hurd, What in the World Is Wrong?, 5 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 157, 163 (1994) (footnote omitted). Kant is often said to adopt the 
first position. See id. at 165.  
 40  Corrective justice “holds that in the event certain conditions attend the breach [of duties 
towards others], a second order duty of repair exists. Whereas the underlying duties of care 
establish in part normative relations between the parties, the breach of such a duty creates a 
different but related normative relationship.” Jules Coleman & Gabriel Mendlow, Theories of 
Tort Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 26, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2008/entries/tort-theories (last visited May 8, 2016); see 
also ARISTOTLE, supra note 26, at 1007-10; IZHAK ENGLARD, CORRECTIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE 
JUSTICE: FROM ARISTOTLE TO MODERN TIMES 185 (2009). Pursuant to Kant, “a publicly 
assured enforceable right to compensation can guarantee that your right will be effective, even 
if I violate it, because the object of the right will once again be subject to your choice.” 
RIPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 166. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss4/7
2016] PRIVATE REQUITALS 973 
 
autonomy space.41 In other words, one’s autonomy space is determined not only by 
her liberty and security freedom as delineated by substantive maxims, but also by the 
cognizable remedial claims for violations of the substantive maxims.42 To twist a 
Roman law maxim, “without a remedy, there is no right,”43 or, correlatively, a duty.  
Under the view that the categorical imperative is a formal concept, a moral agent 
must adopt a complete and coherent set of deontic maxims, both first- and second-
order, that satisfies the wide constraints of the categorical imperative.44 When an 
agent adopts maxims, she may violate one of her substantive maxims in a way that 
falls within the reach of one of her requital maxims.45 If this occurs, a harmed party 
(claimant) can claim that the agent (claimee) has violated her remediable duty to the 
claimant. She has, by her own lights, wrongfully harmed him and owes him a 
requital. Third parties may also be harmed, but not wrongfully harmed if they fall 
outside the reach of any substantive or requital maxim adopted by the agent. For 
example, unrelated observers of a battery are usually not entitled to bring a claim 
against the tortfeasor though they may suffer psychic and other harms from her 
conduct. 
There are, in principle, an infinite number of complete and coherent sets of moral 
maxims consistent with the categorical imperative.46 This enormously complicates 
the standing of a person to claim a violation of her right under a claimee’s maxims. 
For instance, if a person argues that his reasonable expectations, foreseeably aroused 
by the claimee’s conduct, have been harmfully dashed, the claimee may deny that 
                                                            
 41  John Austin refers to this distinction in terms of “primary” or “principal” and 
“secondary” or “sanctioning” rights. See JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE lecture 
xlv (5th ed. 1885). “A wrong is the infringement of a primary right which generates a 
secondary right, commonly but not always a liability to pay compensation.” ROBERT STEVENS, 
TORTS AND RIGHTS 287 (2007) (internal citation omitted). Other labels have been used. See, 
e.g., Kenneth Campbell, Legal Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 11-12, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-rights (last visited May 8, 2016) (“primary” and 
“remedial” rights); Hanoch Sheinman, Tort Law and Corrective Justice, 22 LAW & PHIL. 21, 
28, 30 (2003) (“proscriptive and remedial duties”, or primary and secondary duties). For a 
discussion of first- and second-order tort duties, see JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF 
PRINCIPLE 31-35 (2001). “Retributivism is not a theory of criminality; it is a theory about what 
ought to be, or of what may legitimately be done by the state in those cases where a criminal 
misdeed has been committed.” Id. at 33. “It presupposes an account of criminality, or at least 
of list of what the crimes are.” Id.  
 42  “Remedies . . . participate in the constitution of the rights they help enforce . . . . Thus, 
the choice of different remedies, as well as the possibility of incorporating qualifications, 
limitations, and even obligations, allows private law to accommodate qualitative (and 
normatively attractive) distinctions between different types of rights.” Hanoch Dagan, 
Remedies, Rights, and Properties, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 1 (2011). Regarding “the connection 
between rights and remedies [in the context of contracts,] . . . the scope and limits of the 
remedy affect the essential nature of the right.” Brian H. Bix, Contract Rights and Remedies, 
and the Divergence Between Law and Morality, 21 RATIO JURIS. 194, 200 (2008).  
 43  The maxim, “ubi jus, ibi remedium,” translates, “Where there is a right, there is a 
remedy.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1691 (4th ed. 1951). “It is said that the rule of primitive 
law was the reverse: Where there is a remedy, there is a right.” Id. 
 44  Kuklin, supra note 1, at 381. 
 45  Id. at 381-82. 
 46  Id. at 458. 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
974 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:965 
 
she has adopted a relevant substantive maxim, or assert that the claimant’s aroused 
expectations do not fall within the ambit of what the claimee meant in her adopted, 
relevant maxim by “reasonable” or “foreseeable,”47 or that even if the claimant’s 
expectations fall within the reach of her maxim, that her associated requital maxim 
does not include damages (e.g., apology only required) or cover the type of alleged 
harm (e.g., psychic).48 To get over this hurdle, the claimant may assert that the 
claimee’s prior statements or conduct have manifested the adoption of maxims 
supporting his claim, but this may often require an unrealistically detailed 
knowledge of the claimee’s history. Even with this detailed knowledge, sufficiently 
specifying the maxim so manifested offers notorious problems.49 The circumstances, 
moreover, may be unusual enough that the claimee was never before in a situation in 
which her choice of a relevant maxim was needed.50 Or perhaps two or more broad, 
adopted maxims point to inconsistent conclusions requiring the claimee to refine one 
or more of them to coherently accommodate the case at hand, some possible 
refinements being protective of the claimant and others not.  
Some maxims may be hard or virtually impossible to opt out of under the 
categorical imperative. Malicious, unprovoked homicide always seems over the 
line.51 Yet there is enough discretion about plausible maxims for it to be difficult for 
a claimant to make out an individualized claim in many cases of alleged wrongful 
harms.52 That reasonable people can rationally adopt different sets of moral maxims 
                                                            
 47  “Any principle can be enacted or embodied or instituted in many different ways, among 
which agents have to decide.” Onora O’Neill, Instituting Principles: Between Duty and 
Action, in KANT’S METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 331 (Mark Timmons ed., 2002). “One must look 
to accounts of judgement for a view of the way in which the gap between principle and 
particular act, or pattern of action, is to be bridged.” Id. at 332.  
 48  “[A]lthough others also can create rights through their unilateral will, no one can be 
sure of how others interpret the extent of their respective rights or of whether they are willing 
to abide by the rights of others.” Ernest J. Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant’s System of 
Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 807 (2003). “[E]ach person is the judge of his or her 
own entitlements, doing what seems right and good in his or her own eyes.” Id. at 808 (citing 
KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9, at 455-56).  
 49  “Now there are notorious difficulties in identifying the maxim of a particular action . . . 
.” R. A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 201 (1986) (citation omitted). “A pattern of behavior 
can never fully determine the content of a rule, because any pattern of behavior is consistent 
with an indefinite number of different rules, each of which ‘covers’ past behavior, yet each of 
which would result in different future behavior.” COLEMAN, supra note 41, at 80. “The 
problem stems from the notorious difficulty of specifying the maxim of an action . . . . The 
problem is that it is difficult to find any way of characterizing the proper description of the 
maxim to be tested without relying upon one’s antecedent sense of how the test should come 
out.” THOMAS E. HILL, JR., A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules, in RESPECT, PLURALISM, 
AND JUSTICE 33, 40 (2000); see THOMAS E. HILL, JR., A Kantian Perspective on Political 
Violence, in RESPECT, PLURALISM, AND JUSTICE, 200, 211-13 (2000). For an approach to 
coming up with a set of maxims, see id. at 213-17. 
 50  As Kant suggests, “a requirement to enact a plurality of maxims may be stymied not 
only by the indeterminacy of the maxims, but by agents’ uncertainty about their own 
maxims?” O’Neill, supra note 47, at 338 n.13.  
 51  See supra note 35.  
 52  This is especially true when, as discussed below, infra note 120, the maxim claimed to 
be violated includes “except when” provisos, for these are particularly variable. 
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led Rawls in Political Liberalism to moderate some of his contentions previously 
made in A Theory of Justice.53 Within our existing political realm, these 
complications are solved by the state declaring which maxims control,54 often 
irrespective of a contrary individual choice.55 This state solution remains in the 
background as much as possible. Required deference to state solutions depends on a 
theory of political obligation beyond the reach of this Article.56  
                                                            
 53  “Now the serious problem is this. A modern democratic society is characterized not 
simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a 
pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines 
is affirmed by citizens generally.” JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xvi (1993).  
 54  “In treating the parties as equals, corrective justice precludes either of them from 
unilaterally determining the legal consequences of their relationship. Corrective justice 
thereby requires that disputes be authoritatively resolvable by a third party . . . . [I]n our 
culture, [it is] the judiciary . . . .” WEINRIB, supra note 27, at 218. “An objective valuation of 
interests can be morally justified on the ground that it treats both parties to the lawsuit equally, 
whereas a subjective standard would let the injurer set the terms of the relationship 
unilaterally.” Mark Geistfeld, Economics, Moral Philosophy, and the Positive Analysis of Tort 
Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 27, at 250, 260. An agent who 
establishes the autonomy space boundary between her and others by adopting maxims does, in 
one sense, treat the others as equals. She is consenting to the duties to others that she is 
imposing on the others to her. If disputes over the boundary are turned over to a judge, the 
judge is in the same position as were the private parties. She is imposing duties on others, 
though again, she is accepting the duties for herself. If the disputants both agree to the judge’s 
authority, then their consent solves the equality issue between them. But under the common 
law, the judge’s ruling at the appellate level is generally binding on others within the 
jurisdiction. The equality issue arises for them. They have not consented to the judge’s ruling 
unless we find them bound to a consensual social contract. At this point in the inquiry, many 
commentators, as I see it, simply wave their hands or offer consent arguments for the social 
contract that I find unpersuasive in many situations. See supra notes 16-17 and discussion 
therein. Kant found a nonconsensual social contract. See supra note 15. His rather bald 
assertion looks like hand waving to me. On this issue, I wave my hands also. 
 55  Under Kant, “the state provides duly authorized institutions of adjudication and 
enforcement. These replace the exercise of private judgment about controversial claims with 
the authoritative judgments of courts that determine the scope of each person’s entitlements 
according to what is laid down as right.” Weinrib, supra note 48, at 808-09 (Kant citations 
omitted). “The civil condition is the product of a social contract, which is conceived not as an 
historical occurrence, but as an idea ‘in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of 
a state.’” Id. at 809 (Kant citations omitted); see also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, KANT: THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 36 (1970). “The juridical state is a necessary public coercive institution 
for individual agents who, coexisting in limited space, each unavoidably raise legitimate 
freedom claims against one another, yet who, given their innate equality, lack legitimate 
enforcement authority over one another.” Katrin Flikschuh, Kant’s Sovereignty Dilemma: A 
Contemporary Analysis, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 469, 478 (2010). For the need and origin of the state 
in Kant’s view, see SULLIVAN, supra note 36, at 233-45. See also LARRY ALEXANDER & 
KIMBERLY K. FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY 295-96 (2009) (“rules resolve[] problems of 
coordination, expertise, and efficiency”); Japa Pallikkathayil, Deriving Morality from Politics: 
Rethinking the Formula of Humanity, 121 ETHICS 116 (2010) (discussing the role of the state 
as arbiter of deontic maxims).  
 56  “Contemporary political theory has not been kind to the view that citizens are obligated 
to obey the law just because it is the law, even when they live in relatively just regimes.” 
MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME 72 (1997) (citations omitted). “My own view is that the 
passage of a law prohibiting certain conduct adds nothing to our antecedent moral obligations 
with respect to that conduct . . . .” Id. “My starting point is the assumption that there is no 
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B. Consensual Rights and Duties (Obligations) 
Consent is central to the moral theory embraced in this Article.57 Beyond the 
consent required for the adoption of deontic maxims, an agent by virtue of her 
consent may assume a particular duty to another person or forgo a particular right. 
Consent to assume a duty or forgo a right adjusts the boundaries of one’s baseline 
autonomy space.58 For example, consent to a specific touching may reduce one’s 
otherwise protected realm of security.  
Consent can establish or adjust boundaries having no prior legal or moral 
standing. If a person joins a group, for instance, knowing that its rules require her to 
bow down to its high muckamuck, then it is wrongful, even disrespectful, for her to 
violate the rule, whereas it would not be without the consensual membership.59 Just 
as consent is technically not a defense of privilege to intentional torts, but rather is 
                                                            
general obligation to obey the law, not even a prima facie obligation and not even in a just 
society.” Joseph Raz, Authority and Consent, 67 VA. L. REV. 103, 103 (1981); see JOSEPH 
RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (rev. ed. 1994); A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES 
AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (1981); Gerhard Overland, The Right to Do Wrong, 26 LAW & 
PHIL. 377, 382-83 (2007) (citing M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey 
the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950 (1973)). See generally Leslie Green, Law and Obligations, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 514 (Jules Coleman & Scott 
Shapiro eds., 2002); Richard Dagger & David Lefkowitz, Political Obligation, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-obligation (last visited May 8, 
2016). “Although the lines that separate one theory from another are not always distinct, 
philosophical justifications of political obligation nowadays usually take the form of 
arguments from consent, gratitude, fair play, membership, or natural duty.” Id. at 24.  
 57  Some commentators distinguish moral duties, which arise irrespective of consent, from 
obligations, which require consent. See, e.g., Jody Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract 
and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 1614-15 (2009). “[S]pecial duties are duties that we 
have only in respect of those particular people to whom we stand in a certain significant sort 
of relation or with whom we have had certain significant sorts of interaction.” Overland, supra 
note 56, at 385 (citing SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES 49 (2001)). 
“Many people do believe, as I do not, that their racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
connections bestow associational rights and obligations.” RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR 
HEDGEHOGS 324 (2011).  
 58  For limits to consent, such as to slavery or self-mutilation, see Kuklin, supra note 1, at 
394. Existing criminal law is cautious about consent as a justification. “[T]he consent defense 
in American criminal law, and in the Model Code, is not really a generally defense.” MARKUS 
D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 242 (2002). “The reason generally cited for 
limiting, or even rejecting, consent as a justification is that the criminal law, unlike torts, is 
about ‘public wrongs,’ not ‘private wrongs’ . . . .” Id. at 243. Since my Kantian analysis 
rejects wrongs to the public that are not wrongs to individual moral persons, I would grant 
more room for consent in criminal law—until it becomes self-disrespectful, as in slavery 
contracts.  
 59  “[A] person who wishes to be restricted in various ways, whether by the discipline of 
the monastery, regimentation of the army, or even by coercion, is not, on that account alone, 
less autonomous.” GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 18 (1988). 
Sheinman observes that the membership remains voluntary even though the joiner “does not 
even know what these rules are before becoming a member.” Hanoch Sheinman, Contractual 
Liability and Voluntary Undertakings, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 209 (2000). The 
formal consent suffices.  
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the basis of a claim that, because of the consent, there was no relevant duty to begin 
with,60 so allowable consent to an adjustment of a baseline autonomy space affects a 
later assertion that the consenter’s autonomy space was invaded. Because of the 
consent, there is no wrongful harm.61 Consent not only factors into conceptions of 
wrongful harm, but it also factors into those of blameworthiness. When properly 
consented to, one is not blameworthy for harming another person.  
Consent may be divided into three, overlapping types: hypothetical, formal, and 
material.62 Hypothetical consent is exemplified by a social contract presumed of 
citizens and others whereby certain rights and duties are established.63 Whereas Kant 
did not recognize a social contract based on hypothetical consent,64 various Kantians, 
such as Rawls, have done so.65 Second, formal consent occurs when a person 
manifests consent by choosing to assume duties or forgo rights under conditions of 
partial ignorance or coercion.66 For example, a person who enters an enforceable 
contract formally consents to unread terms and legal contract rules that one knows or 
has reason to know. Third, material consent, at its polar limit, involves an ideally 
rational choice of a fully autonomous person.67 Such consent is completely free of 
ignorance and coercion.68 
In light of deontic principles and these three types of consent, I favor a Consent 
Principle. This Principle declares that the degree or depth of the consent necessary to 
adjust an agent’s baseline autonomy space turns on the extent to which the 
adjustment impacts the agent’s autonomy space.69 The greater the reduction of the 
agent’s autonomy space, the deeper, freer from ignorance and coercion, her consent 
must be.70 For example, consent to sexual relations must be stronger, more informed, 
and freer from coercion, than consent to a kiss and, even less demanding, consent to 
                                                            
 60  See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 112 
(5th ed. 1984) (Consent “is not, strictly speaking, a privilege, or even a defense, but goes to 
negative the existence of any tort in the first instance.”).  
 61  “Once the victim consents [to a harm or an act risking a harm], there is no [legal] 
interest to protect; the victim has in effect conveyed his right to legal protection from the 
actor, at least for some duration.” ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 55, at 276; see also 
THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 182 (1986); STEVENS, supra note 41, at 17 
(“[T]he waiver of the primary [first-order] right means that there is no right to violate, and 
consequently no wrong.”).  
 62  These are not to be confused with hypothetical, formal, and material autonomy space. 
See Kuklin, supra note 1, at 408-14 (“Types of Autonomy Space”).  
 63  Id. 
 64  For a brief account of why Kant resorted to an imaginary contract, not a consensual 
one, see SANDEL, supra note 2, at 142.  
 65  See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).  
 66  These two elements invoke Aristotle’s requisites for responsible conduct, discussed 
supra at notes 26-27.  
 67  Kuklin, supra note 1, at 446-47. 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. at 394 n.63. 
 70  Id. at 395-99. 
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a hug. Likewise, declining a valuable gift requires deeper consent than forgoing a 
nominal one. Consent, of sorts, is also requisite to the adoption of maxims, which 
give rise to rights and duties.71 This consent similarly falls within the Consent 
Principle. For instance, adoption of a maxim necessitating arduous rescues of 
strangers requires richer consent than one demanding the expression of gratitude for 
being rescued.  
III. REQUITALS FOR AUTONOMY INVASIONS 
Requitals apply second-order maxims to rectify violations of adopted first-order, 
substantive maxims. Together, these satisfy requirements of justice. A general form 
of justice is: “To each according to X, from each according to Y.”72 X and Y are 
commonly called “desert,” though some notions of X and Y stretch the ordinary 
meaning of this label.73  
There are various conceptions of X, that is, of what one should receive. 
Corrective justice provides some of the conceptions.74 For example, two conceptions 
of corrective justice (one of them encompassing the bracketed term) are: “To each 
according to wrongful harm [from blameworthiness].”75 Some of these conceptions 
                                                            
 71  In the context of maxims, terms more descriptive than “consent” may be “adoption,” 
“sanction,” “acceptance,” or “approval.”  
 72  The commentators generally focus on the X, “to”, side of the equation. See, e.g., CH. 
PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT 6-29 (1963); Diana T. 
Meyers, Introduction, in ECONOMIC JUSTICE: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITIES 
1-2 (Kenneth Kipnis & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1985); Serena Olsaretti, Introduction: Debating 
Desert and Justice, in DESERT AND JUSTICE 1 (Serena Olsaretti ed., 2003).  
 73  In Feinberg’s classic exposition, desert judgments have the form: “‘S deserves X in 
virtue of F,’ where S is a person, X a mode of treatment, and F some fact about S . . . .” JOEL 
FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND DESERVING 55, 61 (1970).  
 74  “The test of adequacy [for principles of formalism] is satisfied when the justification 
for a doctrine conforms to the structure of corrective justice. More than one doctrine 
concerning a given point may satisfy this test.” WEINRIB, supra note 27, at 228 (citation 
omitted). 
 75  As is the case elsewhere, I bracket certain terms to indicate various conceptions of the 
maxim under consideration. Here there are two identified conceptions of X, one that does not 
require blameworthiness and the other that does. Another of numerous possibilities for the 
brackets involves the nature of the ensuing harms. For example, a particular requital maxim 
may allow recoveries for physical and psychic harms, but not [purely] economic ones. 
  Goldberg suggests that the second conception of corrective justice, which accounts for 
the blameworthiness of the invader, is the only acceptable one. After discussing the injustice 
of the “thin skull” rule, he concludes, “In short, to the extent that tort law is driven by 
considerations of corrective justice, damages for intentional and negligent torts arguably 
should be determined not by the full compensation principle, but by an independent inquiry 
into the nature and gravity of the defendant’s wrongdoing.” John C.P. Goldberg, Misconduct, 
Misfortune, and Just Compensation: Weinstein on Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2041 
(1997) [hereinafter Goldberg, Misconduct] (citation omitted). Goldberg finds that the shift 
from fair compensation for tortious invasions, which accounts for the invader’s 
blameworthiness, and full compensation, which does not, took place in the mid-nineteenth 
century. See John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full 
Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435 (2006). “Blameworthiness of conduct and protected 
interests are the two types of props which, when combined, will make up the ‘grid’ of tort 
law.” Eric Descheemaeker, Protecting Reputation: Defamation and Negligence, 29 OXFORD J. 
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are discussed below. Other conceptions of X are grounded in distributive justice. As 
Aristotle would have it, distributive justice “is manifested in distributions of honour 
or money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in 
the constitution . . . .”76 Today, matters of distributive justice are seen as including 
the distributive effects of norms, legal and otherwise. Retribution, under the view I 
embrace,77 falls within distributive justice.78 Other moral systems, such as 
utilitarianism and perhaps virtue ethics, advance other conceptions of X.79  
Commentators have also championed various conceptions of Y, what a person is 
to give, in the general formula for justice. Under corrective justice and, perhaps, 
retribution, two conceptions of Y are: “From each according to the extent of the 
caused [wrongful] harm.” For distributive justice, two conceptions, arguably 
grounding retribution, are: “From each according to [in proportion to] (negative) 
desert.” Another two are: “From each according to wealth [societal benefits].”80 
Other moral foundations, such as utilitarianism, ground comparable conceptions of 
Y.81  
Corrective justice is the chief deontic principle for privately requiting autonomy 
invasions. Ernest Weinrib, for example, is a leader among those who examine 
                                                            
LEGAL STUD. 603, 603 (2009). Finkelstein disagrees. See Claire Finkelstein, The Irrelevance 
of the Intended to Prima Facie Culpability: Comment on Moore, 76 B.U. L. REV. 335, 335 
(1996). Unlike criminal law, she sees tort law, “at least at present,” as social welfarist, having 
“nothing to do with culpability.” Id. at 345.  
 76  ARISTOTLE, supra note 26, at 1005-06. 
 77  While both corrective justice and retribution are key concepts in delineating autonomy 
space, this Article emphasizes corrective justice more than retribution because this latter 
concept gets most of the attention in my working paper entitled “Public Requitals: Corrective 
Justice, Retribution, and Distributive Justice.”  
 78  See, e.g., C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 5 (1987); Wojciech Sadurski, 
Distributive Justice and the Theory of Punishment, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 47 (1985). 
 79  Under Bentham’s hedonistic version of utilitarianism, the X would be something like 
this: “To each according to the extent that overall happiness is promoted.” See generally 
JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. 
Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (1789).  
  “Virtue ethics . . . may, initially, be identified as the [major approach to normative 
ethics] that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach which 
emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that which emphasizes the consequences of actions 
(consequentialism).” Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/ethics-virtue/ (last visited May 8, 2016). 
Plato, a founder of virtue ethics, identifies justice or fairness as one of the primary virtues. See 
4 PLATO, PROTAGORAS 123, 162-65 (Benjamin Jowett, trans., n.d.). Aristotle, another 
champion of virtue ethics, similarly specified justice as one of “[t]he forms of Virtue.” See 
ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 26, at 1317, 1354.  
 80  The wealth gauge is known as “deep pocket” in tort law or horizontal equity in taxation 
law. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, Tort Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY 64, 76-77 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010); David Elkins, Horizontal 
Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43 (2006).  
 81  For utilitarianism, one conception is: “From each insofar as it increases overall social 
utility.”  
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private law and see Kant and corrective justice as immanent in it.82 But the meaning 
or definition of corrective justice is not settled.83 A variety of plausible conceptions 
are considered below.84  
Although the conceptions of corrective justice discussed here not exhaustive, 
there are two key elements in most notions of X involved: wrongful harm and 
blameworthiness.85 The same is true of conceptions of retribution.86 Wrongness and 
                                                            
 82  Outlining “the morality latent in the structure of tort law,” Weinrib observes that it was 
“first formulated in Aristotle’s discussion of corrective justice and elaborated by Kant . . . .” 
Ernest Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort Law, 34 MCGILL L.J. 403, 403 (1989). See 
generally WEINRIB, supra note 27. “Private law makes corrective justice and Kantian right 
explicit by actualizing them in doctrines, concepts, and institutions that coherently fit 
together.” Id. at 20. “For Kant, as for Aristotle, corrective justice is the justificatory structure 
that pertains to the immediate interaction of doer and sufferer.” Id. at 84. For scrutiny, 
criticism, and defense of Weinrib’s views, see, for example, Peter Benson, The Basis of 
Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515, 535-47 
(1992); Martin Stone, On the Idea of Private Law, 9 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 235, 254, 274-77 
(1996); Catharine P. Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury 
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2374-75 (1990).  
 83  “[D]efinitions of corrective justice differ widely . . . .” Simons, supra note 27, at 871 
(distinguishing corrective justice from retributive and distributive justice). For a general 
discussion of corrective justice, see Coleman & Mendlow, supra note 40, at 20-33. Walt 
identifies at least four different possible purposes for corrective justice. See Steven Walt, 
Eliminating Corrective Justice, 92 VA. L. REV. 1311, 1321 (2006). Two of them relate to the 
distribution of shares. “A third purpose is simply to remedy a wrongful harm. A fourth 
possibility might operate in tort law. Here, the duty of repair arises upon the violation of legal 
entitlements, whether or not the entitlements are morally legitimate.” Id. “Depending on the 
particular purpose identified, the duty of repair may be one of either corrective or distributive 
justice.” Id. 
  “Th[e] rectification [function of corrective justice] operates correlatively on both 
parties. The central feature of a system of liability is that any liability of a particular defendant 
is simultaneously a liability to a particular plaintiff.” ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
16 (2012). 
To leave those costs [“from the actualization of a {inappropriate} risk”] where they 
fall would be to allow one person to set the terms of their interactions with others 
unilaterally, for it would be to allow injurers to pursue their ends at the expense of 
others. Alternatively, to hold them in common would be unjust in a different way, for 
it would be to allow one person to demand extra resources from the state so as to spare 
him the costs of looking out for the security of others. Thus, the law of private 
damages is required in order to guarantee a regime of equal freedom. 
Arthur Ripstein, Three Duties to Rescue: Moral, Civil, and Criminal, 19 L. & PHIL. 751, 762 
(2000).  
 84  I plan to add to these plausible conceptions and take up the issue of proper requitals, 
i.e., the Y in the formula of justice, in my future Article “Public Requitals: Corrective Justice, 
Retribution, and Distributive Justice.”  
 85  In each of these conceptions of corrective justice, harm plays a central role, but 
Ripstein identifies torts that are not harm-based: “[A] fault element is a familiar feature of 
harm-based torts, but never a feature of trespass-based torts. (Confusion about this leads some 
to suppose that ‘intentional’ names a culpable mental state, more serious than negligence.) . . . 
Harm-based torts occur when separate persons pursue their separate purposes.” Arthur 
Ripstein, Tort Law in a Liberal State, 1 J. TORT L. 3, 16 (2007). “Trespass-based torts have no 
fault element. Each person has a protected liberty interest in using his or her means in ways 
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blameworthiness are distinct notions.87 Wrongful harm, established by the violation 
of a first-order, substantive maxim designed to proscribe certain types or sources of 
harms, is identified above; whereas harm from negligence may be proscribed when 
harm from an “inevitable accident” is not. Justifications for harmful conduct are 
often said to be denials of wrongness.88 An agent’s blameworthiness, or culpability,89 
I contend, largely relates to the disrespectfulness towards an invadee reflected in the 
agent’s conduct (action or inaction).90 Maxims may include blameworthiness as a 
threshold standard (e.g., negligence) or as a factor that increases or decreases the 
invader’s obligatory requital (e.g., some intentional torts, retribution), as seen in 
what follows.  
“When one wrongfully harms another person by blameworthy conduct, she is to 
compensate that person [the state] to the extent of the [wrongful] harm.” “The state” 
is bracketed for use of the formula for criminal punishment, in which case the state is 
in some way “compensated” by fine or otherwise.91 In the criminal context, perhaps 
another word, such as “repay,” “restore,” or “restitute,” captures more of the idea, 
                                                            
that generally do not interfere with the ability of others to do the same, but nobody has a 
protected liberty interest in using means that belong to another.” Id. at 18. I would argue that 
Ripstein’s trespass-based torts do have a fault element, weak at times, and are harmful to the 
invadee. They are wrongful dignitary harms. Referring to the first quote, one might also find 
that one of the trespassed landowner’s purposes is to exclude trespassers.  
 86  “[There] is the deeply entrenched notion that the measure [of retributive punishment] 
should not be, or not only be, the subjective wickedness of the offender but the amount of 
harm done.” H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 234 (1968). Moore discusses the 
need for a moral theory to justify “when someone deserves to be punished . . . . On the moral 
theory I think to be most plausible, moral desert is built on two moral properties, wrongdoing 
and culpability.” Michael S. Moore, Responsible Choices, Desert-Based Legal Institutions, 
and the Challenges of Contemporary Neuroscience, 29 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 233, 234 (Winter 
2012) (footnote omitted).  
 87  “[W]rongness and blame can come apart. The blameworthiness of an action depends, in 
ways that wrongness generally does not, on the reasons for which a person acted and the 
conditions under which he or she did so.” T.M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS: 
PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BLAME 124 (2008). “[A]ny adequate statement of the necessary or 
sufficient conditions for being blameworthy will have to make essential reference to acts that 
are wrong. At least to this extent, I take the concept of wrongness to be prior to that of 
blameworthiness.” GEORGE SHER, IN PRAISE OF BLAME 9 n.7 (2006) (noting that Gibbard 
“reverses this ordering” in ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE FEELINGS, APT CHOICES 40-45 (1990)). The 
reactions to blame include anger and other negative feelings, hostile behavior, reproach, and, 
for self-blame, apology. Id. at 94-95. For Sher’s formulation of blameworthiness, see id. at 
132-33.  
 88  See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 85 (1998).  
 89  While “blameworthiness” and “culpability” have been distinguished, see, for example, 
Kenneth W. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory: The Problem of Criminal 
Negligence, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 365, 367 (1994). For my purposes a distinction is 
not important, so I discuss them together.  
 90  See Bailey Kuklin, The Labyrinth of Blameworthiness, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2016).  
 91  The state, not being a moral person, cannot be “compensated” in the way that moral 
persons can be. 
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though still imperfectly. If we think of the state not as an independent, collective 
entity, but rather as a representative for requiting harms to individual citizens, the 
terms become more satisfactory.  
“When one wrongfully harms another person by blameworthy conduct, she is to 
compensate that person [the state] to the extent of the [wrongful] harm and 
blameworthiness.” In these versions, blameworthiness comes in twice, first, as a 
threshold standard to determine whether the wrongful harm is compensable or 
deserving of retribution, and second, as a factor in the measure of the requital.  
“When one wrongfully harms another person, she is to compensate that person to 
the extent of the [wrongful] harm.” This, under one interpretation, is strict liability.92 
Under Richard Epstein’s conception, “you did it, you pay.”93 Strict liability still 
requires the harm to be wrongful. Some harms are not requitable, such as most 
stemming from inaction or under the doctrine, “live and let live.”94 This version of 
corrective justice is often associated with libertarianism.95 
                                                            
 92  “Four varieties of strict legal liability can be distinguished, which I will call passive 
strict liability, right-based strict liability, activity-based strict liability and outcome-based 
strict liability.” PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY 82 (2002); see id. at 82-
84. One may wish to adopt different maxims for each of the four varieties.  
 93  By “you did it,” Epstein means, paradigmatically, wrongful harms from force, fright, 
compulsion, and creation of dangerous conditions. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict 
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 160-89 (1973). Some commentators ask, why these 
paradigms and not others? See Jules L. Coleman, Legal Theory and Practice, 83 GEO. L.J. 
2579, 2598 (1995) [hereinafter Coleman, Legal Theory]; Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, 
Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91, 106-07 (1995); Stephen R. Perry, The 
Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 1 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 147 (1988) [hereinafter Perry, 
Impossibility]. For further criticism, see, for example, MOORE, supra note 56, at 357-58, 361; 
Stephen R. Perry, The Distributive Turn: Mischief, Misfortune and Tort Theory, in 
ANALYZING LAW 141, 148 (Brian Bix ed., 1998); Coleman, Legal Theory, supra, at 2614-17; 
Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory, 9 
J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 55-63 (1980).  
 94  See, e.g., Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 32-33 (1862); Richard Epstein, 
Transaction Costs and Property Rights: Or Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?,,1 
ENVTL. L. & PROP. RTS. PRAC. GROUP NEWSL., no. 2, May 1997, http://www.fed-
soc.org/publications/detail/transaction-costs-and-property-rights-or-do-good-fences-make-
good-neighbors. “Some level of risk is simply the price of freedom to act, and that level of 
risk is the background level . . . . Because these risks are the price of ordinary activity, we are 
all better off bearing them than attempting to reduce them.” Keating, supra note 31, at 45.  
 95  See Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 93, at 91. Notice a certain irony in the libertarian 
adoption of this conception: the various understandings of wrongful harms and corrective 
justice identified here produce differing tradeoffs between the protection of a person’s liberty 
and security interests. By embracing a strict liability standard for particular impacts, this 
version of corrective justice favors security over liberty. Perhaps these libertarians should be 
relabeled “securitarians.” Locke, for example, seemingly falls within this camp. See JOHN 
LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 265, 412-13 
(Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1690) (“Men enter into Society . . . [and authorize laws] to limit the 
Power, and moderate the Dominion of every Part and Member of the society . . . . [T]he 
people . . . provide for their own Safety and Security, which is the end for which they are in 
Society.”). For similar emphasis of security over liberty, see, for example, 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *119 (1768); JOHN STUART MILL, 
Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 1, 67 (J.M. 
Dent & Sons 1910) (1st ed. London 1863); see also Kuklin, supra note 1, at 387 n.31.  
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In the conceptions of corrective justice displayed above, harms are lumped 
together, but justifiable conceptions may vary according to the particular types of 
harms in question. Here are some examples. 
“When one physically, economically, or psychically harms another person 
wrongfully by blameworthy conduct, she is to compensate that person to the extent 
of the harm [and blameworthiness].” This would exclude dignitary harm from 
ordinary tort recoveries but, as stated, would allow recovery for pure economic loss 
alone. To elaborate on the bracketed permutation of this maxim to identify further 
examples, the extent of the recovery for psychic harm could depend on the degree of 
the blameworthiness (disrespect). For instance, for ordinary negligence the invadee 
may recover for the foreseeable psychic harm of a reasonable person, while for 
intentional conduct, the invadee may recover for the foreseeable psychic harm of the 
actual invadee when greater than that of the reasonable person, and for purposive or 
malicious conduct, all the psychic harm is remediable, foreseeable or not.96  
“When one wrongfully harms another person’s dignity, she is to compensate that 
person to the extent of the harm and her blameworthiness.” This suggests that pure 
dignitary harm recoveries take into account the reduced or increased 
blameworthiness of the invader, unlike ordinary tort damages for other types of 
harms. An unforeseeable trespass to realty, for instance, as where one reasonably 
believes the property is her own, allows for nominal damages, while knowing 
trespass allows for more damages even in the absence of other harms.  
“When one wrongfully, economically harms another person by exacerbated 
[purposive, knowledgeable, reckless, intentional] blameworthy conduct, she is to 
compensate that person to the extent of the harm.” Like the pure economic loss 
doctrine in torts,97 this conception would allow for such recoveries when the actor’s 
                                                            
 96  One view is “that those who intentionally cause harm should be liable for more remote 
consequences than those who negligently cause harm. This seems to be the position today in 
the law of torts.” GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 370 (1978). This view has 
been advanced for contract damages as well. See Note, The Inadequacy of Hadley v. 
Baxendale as a Rule for Determining Legal Cause, 26 U. PITT. L. REV. 795, 802 (1965).  
   The subjective nature of psychic harm is troublesome. “Many are wary of giving 
highly idiosyncratic victims’ preferences too much weight, mainly because they worry about 
abuse. Others think it’s just plain arbitrary to ignore the victim’s feelings.” Leo Katz, A Look 
at Tort Law with Criminal Law Blinders, 76 B.U. L. REV. 307, 315 (1996). For criminal law 
matters, Katz favors “the objective view of injuries.” Id. Monetary compensation for psychic 
harms may be, in principle, problematic. “[I]ntangible losses and monetary damages are 
simply incommensurable. The real difficulty with damage awards for intangible loss is that 
they purport to be compensatory when in reality they are not.” Steven D. Smith, The Critics 
and the “Crisis”: A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 
765, 770 (1987) (citations omitted). “The impossibility of precisely quantifying intangible 
injuries does not mean that awards for such injuries are necessarily illegitimate. Instead, the 
dispute resolution conception of tort remedies suggests that damage awards express societal 
recognition of the gravity of the plaintiff’s injury.” Id. at 788.  
 97  See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1115 (2000) (“Broadly speaking, the 
plaintiff who claims a stand-alone commercial or economic tort must usually (but not 
invariably) prove intent rather than negligence.”); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 606 (1999) 
(“The general legal position today denies recovery to P for pure economic loss as a result of 
D’s negligence.”). There has been a major controversy in tort law over “the extent to which 
the law should exclude protection for pure economic loss.” GORDLEY, supra note 27, at 217. 
See generally id. at 263-84 (“Liability in Tort for Pure Economic Loss”). Gordley discusses 
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blameworthiness (disrespect) is heightened beyond ordinary negligence, but not 
otherwise. In these cases, there likely are substantial dignitary harms as well as 
economic ones.  
Beyond these identified permutations, different conceptions of corrective justice, 
or different wrongful harms subject to requitals, may use different standards of 
causation, both cause in fact and proximate cause. The element of cause in fact for 
psychic harm may be based on, say, a “but for” standard, while for physical harm, 
“substantial factor.”98 
In general, there is a wide range of conceptions of corrective justice and 
retribution that may be adopted by an individual or the state on behalf of individuals 
to coordinate their behavior.99 So long as a second-order, requital maxim satisfies the 
categorical imperative,100 whether or not to adopt it is a matter of preference and 
                                                            
the difficulty with implementing an economic loss doctrine as a rationale for limiting it. See 
id. at 280-84. Ripstein justifies the existing economic loss doctrine on the grounds “that, 
although the possibility of my losing something on which I have come to rely could be the 
basis of a norm of conduct, it would place too great a burden on your liberty to be asked to 
take account of such things.” Arthur Ripstein, Philosophy of Tort Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 56, at 656, 683 [hereinafter Ripstein, 
Philosophy]. This seems conclusory. Is it too great a burden to take account of the foreseeable 
economic consequences of your negligent conduct? Is it less of a burden on the person whose 
security interest is truncated by such negligent conduct? Risk avoidance and other policy 
considerations also obtain. Ripstein asserts that an appropriate balance cannot be struck. See 
id. at 685; Arthur Ripstein, As If It Had Never Happened, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 
1977 (2007) (after noting the floodgates argument, making the conclusory point, “There is no 
liability in negligence for pure economic loss because the plaintiff has no proprietary right to 
the economic interest that was injured.”). One commentator, puzzled that pure economic loss 
is non-recoverable, notes that “courts have of late made a number of exceptions to the 
economic loss rule and it is harder than it once was to say what exactly the rule is.” Henry E. 
Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts, 4 J. TORT L. 5, 26 (2011) (citation 
omitted). See generally Gennady A. Gorel, Note, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Arguing for 
the Intermediate Rule and Taming the Tort-Eating Monster, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 517 (2006).  
 98  For causation in fact, see generally DOBBS, supra note 97, at 405-18; PROSSER & 
KEETON, supra note 60, at 263-72.  
 99  “[L]aw promises coordination in any enterprise it undertakes, whether that is 
substantive justice or the maximization of well-being . . . . [P]rincipled consistency is 
normatively indispensable in the forcible pursuit of substantive justice.” Jeremy Waldron, 
Does Law Promise Justice?, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 759, 787 (2001). Turning the choice of the 
version of corrective justice over to individuals “mak[es] each person’s security depend on the 
particular priorities of his or her injurer. Those difficulties would be doubled because each 
person’s liberty would depend on the particular sensibilities of his or her potential victims.” 
Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 93, at 109. In the context of negligence and elsewhere, 
existing law solves this indeterminacy problem by looking to the reasonable person standard, 
custom, and convention. See id. at 112. But still, the individual can ask, “why should I be held 
to such a standard. I did not consent to it.” Thus the beast of political obligation once again 
raises its formidable head. Yet, because the law must hone sometimes nebulous general moral 
principles, “[t]he effect of legal determinations of moral principle is often to make them 
obligatory as part of morality, quite apart from any general presumption there may be in 
favour of a moral duty to obey the law.” TONY HONORE, Introduction, in RESPONSIBILITY AND 
FAULT, supra note 27, at 1, 8.  
 100  “Kant’s insight is that just as primary rights to freedom must be subject to reciprocal 
limits, so too must secondary rights to enforcement.” Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and 
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judgment reflecting, among other things, relative weights or valuations given to the 
various aspects of liberty, security, wrongness, and blameworthiness.101 As seen in 
the proffered examples, an agent may adopt many, diverse conceptions of corrective 
justice,102 to say nothing of retribution, each one depending on the substantive 
maxim in issue and the particularities of the circumstances. She may choose one 
conception for intentional harms, another for negligent harms, another for 
abnormally dangerous activities, others depending on the types of harms, and so 
forth.  
IV. COMMON AUTONOMY SPACE BOUNDARY MARKERS 
There is an interrelationship between first- and second-order maxims; that is, 
between substantive maxims directly establishing autonomy space boundaries and 
applicable maxims that specify requitals for particular autonomy space incursions. 
For example, suppose one adopts a first-order maxim that declares, “do not harm 
another person.” This is inordinately demanding, implicitly proscribing an ordinary, 
inadvertent bumping into another person in a crowd, or economic loss to another 
from fair business practices, or even psychic harm to another from envy of the 
agent’s legitimate success. Then, as a requital for this substantive maxim pursuant to 
corrective justice, assume one adopts a second-order maxim that states, “when one 
{wrongfully} harms another person by blameworthy conduct, she is to compensate 
that person to the extent of the {wrongful} harm.”103 The strictness of the substantive 
maxim is thus ameliorated by this associated conception of corrective justice. 
Requital under it requires the harm to ensue from blameworthy conduct, which, 
presumably, would not reach the implicit, quotidian harms mentioned. Inadvertent 
bumping in a crowd is not disrespectful, not blameworthy. Significant harm from 
such contact is not foreseeable, not blameworthy. In identifying an agent’s baseline 
autonomy space, both the relevant substantive maxims and associated requital 
maxims must be integrated.  
First-order, substantive maxims must cohere with associated second-order, 
requital maxims. Consider these first- and second-order maxims: “Do not purposely 
produce an unreasonable risk of harming another person”; “when one wrongfully 
harms another person by blameworthy conduct, she is to compensate that person to 
the extent of the wrongful harm.” In this substantive maxim, the implications of 
“purposely produce an unreasonable risk” have overtones of disrespect 
blameworthiness. If one purposely intends to produce such a risk, one tacitly 
disrespects the dignity of the person put at risk. One is dismissive. One chooses, or is 
willing to use the person, as a means only. In light of this interpretation, the second-
                                                            
Public Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92 VA. L. REV. 1391, 1418 (2006). “[E]nforcement must be 
done in a way that is consistent with freedom in accordance with universal laws.” Id.  
 101  Coleman and Ripstein refer to “substantive judgements about why various activities 
matter to us and about the ways in which they do.” Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 93, at 
109.  
 102  “[W]hile corrective justice may morally require that individual agents (and perhaps 
even the state) do something about the wrongs they do to others, it need not specify precisely 
what should be done.” WILLIAM LUCY, PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE LAW 414 (2007).  
 103  Under the given substantive maxim, all harms are wrongful, thus the curly bracketing 
of “wrongful.”  
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order maxim, “when one wrongfully harms another person by blameworthy conduct 
. . .” does not fit neatly with the given first-order maxim. The wrongful harm 
(“purposely produc[ing] an unreasonable risk”) already implies blameworthiness. 
The requital maxim when combined with substantive maxim comes down to, “when 
one is blameworthy in causing a harm to another person by blameworthy conduct . . . 
.”104 
One may resolve this type of overlap between the first- and second-order maxims 
by modifying one or both of them. One plausible way is: “Do not purposely produce 
an unreasonable risk of harming another person,” or “when one wrongfully harms 
another person [deleted: “by blameworthy conduct”], she is to compensate that 
person to the extent of the wrongful harm.” Another plausible way is: “Do not 
[deleted: “purposely”] produce an unreasonable risk of harming another person,” or 
“when one wrongfully harms another person by blameworthy conduct, she is to 
compensate that person to the extent of the wrongful harm.” 
Yet something can be said for accommodating potential overlaps in the thrust of 
substantive maxims and associated requital maxims. In addressing particular harms 
in distinct circumstances, overlaps may be difficult to avoid without tortuously 
explicit maxims. Overlaps may also provide flexibility for the application of maxims 
to questionable conduct impossible or impractical to fully anticipate or specify 
beforehand. Consider these changes to the substantive maxim above. Instead of, 
“purposely produce an unreasonable risk . . . ,” the weaker mental state 
“intentionally produce an unreasonable risk . . . ,” or, weaker still, “foreseeably 
produce an unreasonable risk . . . ,” may still connote disrespect and responsibility 
blameworthiness, to some extent, depending on the circumstances.105 Degrees of 
                                                            
 104  The other prong of blameworthiness, responsibility (lack of ignorance and coercion), 
remains in place.  
 105  Regarding “intention,” Prosser notes that, for intentional torts today, “it is a state of 
mind . . . about consequences of an act (or omission) and not about the act itself.” PROSSER & 
KEETON, supra note 60, at 34. Under this, intentionally stepping onto property which one 
reasonably but mistakenly believes is one’s own is still a trespass, though the 
blameworthiness, both disrespect and responsibility, may be minimal. Nonetheless, we still 
may wish to symbolically protect the dignitary interest of such a harmed party, as by granting 
nominal damages for trespass to realty causing no economic damage. Dignitary harms turn on 
objective manifestations of disrespect as well as subjective mental states. Impermissibly 
stepping on another’s property may manifest disrespect of her and her property claims, 
depending on the situation and relevant social norms. Agents are on notice of the strictness of 
trespass doctrine. They thus can foresee in a weak sense their potential liability for their 
conduct. See infra note 106. Fletcher would partially protect the “innocent” trespasser. After 
noting that the excuse of unavoidable ignorance does not defeat some intentional torts, such as 
trespass to land, he argues that when the plaintiff seeks damages, and is not simply testing the 
title to the land, the excuses of “compulsion and unavoidable ignorance . . . transcend 
doctrinal barriers and apply in all cases of nonreciprocal risk-taking.” George P. Fletcher, 
Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 556 (1972).  
  Regarding “foreseeability”, it also may not imply disrespectfulness in any substantial or 
significant sense, as where statistical lives are foreseeably put at risk in a large construction 
project. Especially this is true when those at risk knowingly consent to assuming it. According 
to Aquinas, if not before, “[t]here is a distinction between what we intend and what we 
foresee.” MOORE, supra note 56, at 690-91 (referring to the doctrine of double effect). 
“Responsibility for one’s actions’ side-effects – foreseen or foreseeable – is morally and 
humanly different in kind from responsibility for what one intends, and therefore ought to be 
regarded as a distinct kind of basis for tortious liability.” John Finnis, Natural Law: The 
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disrespect are suggested by these maxims. To come at this point from a different 
direction, when an agent’s conduct is described in these ways; (1) “she put him at an 
unreasonable risk . . .,” (2) “she foreseeably put him at an unreasonable risk . . .,” (3) 
“she intentionally put him at an unreasonable risk,” or finally, (4) “she purposely put 
him at unreasonable risk,” we think, without knowing more, that the agent’s 
blameworthiness increases with each revised description. The meanings of each of 
these key terms, “unreasonable,” “foreseeable,” “intention,” and “purpose,” have 
much penumbra around the cores.106 Overlaps in terminology and meanings of the 
first- and second-order maxims may be resolved in practice by applying different 
penumbral connotations of the terms, one for the substantive maxim and another for 
the requital maxim. This disappoints our preference to provide unambiguous notice 
to agents of the reach of the maxims they must satisfy,107 yet we have come to live 
with this problem daily. We often establish legal standards (“act reasonably”) rather 
than rules (“do not do x, y, or z”). At times, flexibility is deemed more important 
than high predictability.  
One pronounced reason for overlaps between substantive and requital maxims is 
that both maxims typically include the notion of foreseeability either implicitly or 
explicitly. Under existing tort law, the substantive negligence maxim (in a nutshell, 
“act reasonably”) implies foreseeability, and the requital maxim, corrective justice, 
usually does too.108 Foreseeability is often, if not always, an aspect of all four or five 
elements of negligence: duty, breach, causation (cause in fact and proximate cause), 
and damages.109 Observing that, “[f]oreseeability is undoubtedly a muddle in the law 
                                                            
Classical Tradition, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 
supra note 56, at 1, 46. But the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests that those who act 
with knowledge are equally responsible as those who act with intent. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).  
 106  For example, Moore sees the “conceptual problem with foreseeability” as stemming 
from “the ambiguity in what is meant by ‘foreseeable’ . . . , the obvious vagueness of the term 
. . . , [and, more seriously,] “the multiple description problem.” MOORE, supra note 56, at 363-
64. For the latter problem, see infra note 189. “I thus conclude that the criminal and tort law 
conceptions of proximate causation in terms of foreseeability are completely indeterminate in 
all cases.” MOORE, supra note 56, at 395. But, Moore explains, this is not the case “as that 
concept is used as part of what is meant by negligence . . . .” Id. at 398.  
 107  “The values served by the virtue of predictability are liberty (because more accurate 
planning is possible) and fairness (because surprise is reduced).” MOORE, supra note 56, at 11. 
There are limits to the acceptable shortfall in predictability. To provide adequate notice, under 
the legality principle “no one can be criminally punished if the crime of which he is guilty has 
not been enacted by statute . . . .” Larry Alexander, The Philosophy of Criminal Law, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 56, at 815, 823. 
See generally FLETCHER, supra note 96, at 206-14 (“Justice versus Legality”).  
 108  See generally David G. Owen, Figuring Foreseeability, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1277 
(2009). To slide down the slippery slope, “all persons understand, at some level, that 
consequences outside the realm of their expectations sometimes do occur, and so at some level 
of abstract understanding they ‘foresee’ the possibility of such unexpected results.” Id. at 
1288.  
 109  “Among the five elements of which negligence is comprised [separating out proximate 
cause and cause in fact], most scholars agree that foreseeability is implicated in three: duty, 
breach, and proximate cause.” Owen, id. at 1290 (footnoting the role of foreseeability in the 
remaining two, factual causation and damages). In contracts, foreseeability plays a strong role. 
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of negligence,”110 Benjamin Zipursky, after examining the role of foreseeability in 
duty, breach, and proximate cause, concludes, “foreseeability does not play a single 
role within negligence law, but a complex variety of connected roles.”111 In 
principle, one could avoid the overlap of foreseeability by narrowly specifying, 
based on its particular contextual role, its meaning and confining each use to one or 
the other of the first- and second-order maxims, or to a single element of a maxim.112 
But it would often significantly undercut our established norms to unduly restrict the 
important role of foreseeability. Nonetheless, legal doctrines challenging the 
ubiquity of foreseeability requirements include the “thin skull” doctrine,113 
                                                            
All recoverable contract damages must be reasonably foreseeable to the breacher at the time 
of entering into the contract. See, e.g., Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981). “Although the [contract foreseeability] 
requirement neither demands absolute clairvoyance nor admits of vague premonition, it leaves 
considerable latitude between these extremes.” E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for 
Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1204 (1970).    
   Criminal law need not be left out of this examination of foreseeability. By way of 
prelude, criminal liability also requires both cause in fact and proximate cause. See DUBBER, 
supra note 58, at 128-29. In the criminal law, “[p]roximate causation, typically formulated as 
either a question of foreseeability or harm within the risk, limits the reach of causation in 
fact.” Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, The Unsolved Mysteries of Causation and Responsibility, 42 
RUTGERS L.J. 347, 349 (2011). “Much has been written either asserting or denying that the 
conceptions of proximate causation used in torts and criminal law are the same.” MOORE, 
supra note 56, at 363 n.1 (referring to the role of foreseeability in the tests of proximate 
causation).  
 110  Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Many Faces of Foreseeability, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
156, 156 (2000). The same can be said of proximate cause in general. See Heidi M. Hurd & 
Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 333, 336 (2002) (“It is 
well known that the tests for proximate causation in Anglo-American tort law and criminal 
law are elusive, multiple, and often conflicting in their implications for cases.”). Under the 
view that the tests of proximate cause “ask the wrong question . . . [,] the central problem the 
proximate cause tests address is the problem of lack of fit between what defendant intended, 
foresaw, or risked, on the one hand, and what defendant caused in fact, on the other.” Id. at 
336-37. “The issue, on this view, has nothing to do with causation but, rather, with 
culpability.” Id. at 337. “A defendant is culpable for an unjustified harm if he positively 
intended to cause the harm, knew that it would happen, was consciously aware of a risk that it 
would happen, or should have been consciously aware of a risk that it would happen.” Id. at 
385.  
 111  Zipursky, supra note 110, at 158; see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in 
Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247 (2009) [hereinafter 
Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach]. “Foreseeability is the great paradox of tort: one of its 
most vital moral tethers, yet irretrievably its most elusive.” Owen, supra note 108, at 1277. 
“[W]hile foreseeability may be the fundamental moral glue of tort, it provides so little 
decisional guidance that scholars often revile it for being vague, vacuous, and indeterminate . . 
. .” Id. at 1278.  
 112  In negligence, for instance, the main liability limiting function of foreseeability can be 
(largely) satisfied through any one of its elements. For example, compare Overseas Tankship 
(U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (The Wagon Mound No. 1), [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.) 
(appeal taken from N.S.W.) (U.K.), with Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 
1928).  
 113  See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 97, at 464-65; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 60, at 296. 
A case can be make that the “thin skull” doctrine is contrary to deontic justice, embraced for 
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probabilistic causation (lost chance),114 market share liability,115 and strict products 
liability.116  
Notice that the elements of negligence as usually understood imply both first- 
and second-order maxims. Putting the negligence standard this way, “[w]hen one 
wrongfully harms another person by blameworthy conduct, one is to compensate her 
to the extent of the harm,” the duty element points to a substantive, first-order 
maxim (“[d]o not wrongfully harm another person”). This does not point 
unambiguously, because “wrongful harm” needs further specification. “An 
unreasonable risk of harm” commonly specifies a “wrongful harm” in the negligence 
context. The negligence standard can then be elaborated this way: “When one 
imposes an unreasonable risk of harm on another person by blameworthy conduct, 
one is to compensate her to the extent of the harm.” Under this articulation, the 
implicit breach, causation, and damages elements point to a particular requital, 
second-order maxim.117  
In sum, depending on the first-order maxims directly marking autonomy space 
boundaries, conceptions of corrective justice as implemented in second-order, 
requital maxims may be substantial, if indirect, determinants of these boundaries as 
well. How much of the work in establishing boundary markers is done by each of the 
associated maxims is a matter of convenience, values, and judgment. A parallel case 
can be made in the context of retributive punishment for criminal conduct.  
                                                            
other reasons, such as risk avoidance, loss spreading, “two innocents” doctrine, cost 
internalization, etc. “The gap between full compensation and just compensation appears most 
clearly in negligence law’s embrace of the ‘thin skull’ rule.” Goldberg, Misconduct, supra 
note 75, at 97 (footnote omitted). See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing 
Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1563, 1581 (2006). Ripstein objects. “[T]he eggshell plaintiff . . . recovers because she 
has been wronged; the extent of the injury determines the extent of the wrong, and so, too, of 
the remedy.” Arthur Ripstein, Civil Recourse and Separation of Wrongs and Remedies, 39 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 163, 196 (2011). Wronged, yes, but the extent of the wrong (injury), I 
would have it, is up for grabs. Within a plausible range, it is for the law to determine, with 
justification. Moreover, the “thin skull” doctrine is supportable deontically by a requital 
maxim that if one can foresee some harm of a particular type, then one is liable for 
unforeseeable, more extensive harm of that type. While the foreseeability is attenuated, there 
is some degree of foreseeability. At times one may formally consent to liability for 
unforeseeable harms. If one chooses to engage in conduct about which one has reason to know 
are obligatory maxims proscribing unforeseeable harms, one has consented in some measure 
to liability for unforeseeable harms. See infra note 189. In the end, “[t]he examples just 
enumerated [e.g., “the thin-skull rule”] suggest, and many commentators on the subject have 
come to accept, that the legal concept of proximate causation is not a single moral principle 
but rather a grab bag of differing normative considerations.” Perry, Responsibility for 
Outcomes, supra note 27, at 96.  
 114  See DOBBS, supra note 97, at 430-32; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 60, at 272.  
 115  See DOBBS, supra note 97, at 436-38; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 60, at 271-72, 
713-14; Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 27, at 96 (adding respondeat superior 
to the list).  
 116  See DOBBS, supra note 97, at 972-77; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 60, at 690-94.  
 117  The causation element can also be seen as an aspect of the first-order, substantive 
maxim. Whether one has harmed another person entails the question of causation.  
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A. First-Order, Substantive Maxims 
Thus far, I have emphasized the role of second-order, requital maxims in the 
effective, indirect construction of an agent’s autonomy space. This section examines 
a panoply of primarily first-order, substantive maxims that directly delineate 
boundaries. In the jurisprudential literature over the years, this consumes most of the 
ink. In any case, the interconnections and overlaps between substantive and 
complementary requital maxims blur their distinction. When considering plausible 
maxims for adoption, I stress the centrality of the balance between liberty and 
security interests while meeting the constraints of the categorical imperative. Judging 
the balance in conflicting interests highlights two or three ideas: (1) the liberty to 
make choices to engage in conduct (action or inaction); (2) the security from impacts 
by the actions of others; and; (3) concomitantly, the freedom from being used as a 
means only to another’s ends. The third idea encompasses the freedom from various 
forms of disrespect by others. While this dignitary “freedom from” may be seen as a 
facet of one’s general security interest, it is discussed separately because of its 
prominence as a trail signpost in the following discussion. 
In the proceeding parts, I consider situations in which the liberty and security 
interests of people may conflict. I then identify and discuss some plausible maxims 
designed to demarcate relevant autonomy space boundaries, keeping in mind the 
demands of mutual respect. 
1. Intentional, Harmful Conduct 
The categorical imperative suggests that intentional acts foreseeably causing 
harm to another person are, prima facie, wrongful.118 They seem disrespectful. They 
seem invasive of a reasonable person’s security or liberty interests.119 This favors 
adoption of the maxim, “do not intentionally harm another person.” But this general 
maxim needs significant refinement in light of the complexities of human 
interactions, for there are many accepted exceptions, as where one intentionally 
makes another person suffer by means of a fair athletic contest. In addition, broad 
prima facie maxims often conflict in certain circumstances. There are, ultimately, 
numerous exceptions needed to virtually all general maxims, that is, “except when” 
or “unless” provisos.120  
There is a multitude of plausible deontic maxims relating to intentional acts and 
omissions, and also a multitude of justifiable judgments about how to resolve 
conflicts among prima facie maxims. The prominent ones, however, have been 
sufficiently explored in existing tort, contract, restitution, and criminal law. They 
are, therefore, passed over in light of this Article’s aims here. The core of intentional 
torts, contract breaches, unjust enrichment,121 and criminal acts generally fit easily 
within the constraints of the categorical imperative.122  
                                                            
 118  Again, one must be careful not to conflate foreseeability and intention. See supra note 
104.  
 119  For the normative relationship between intention and harm, see generally R.A. Duff, 
Intentions Legal and Philosophical, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 76 (1989).  
 120  As noted above, see supra note 13, a maxim may be universal without being extensive. 
For a discussion of the deontic difference between universalization and generalization, see 
Kuklin, supra note 1, at 421-23.  
 121  “The law of unjust enrichment, [contrary to tort and contract law,] concerns itself with 
reversing certain kinds of non-wrongful transactions on the ground that their non-reversal 
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But we must not grant too much deontic inevitability to the existing law 
regarding intentional conduct. As an example, here is the standard of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts for Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional 
Distress: 
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or 
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to 
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results 
from it, for such bodily harm.123 
We may begin by asking, why does recovery for psychic harm apparently subsume 
recovery for dignitary harm? Why must the intentional or reckless conduct be 
severe?124 Does the balance here unduly favor the liberty of the actor over the 
security of the victim?125 While the common law of torts may generally be quite 
mature, it still has much room to grow (and contract): “The Institute expresses no 
opinion as to whether there may not be other circumstances under which the actor 
may be subject to liability for the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional 
distress.”126 
Below I explore some of the more interesting and controversial situations in 
which conflicts among the interests of interacting agents may arise. Some of these 
involve intentional conduct. I sample tenable, deontic maxims that might be adopted 
to resolve the conflicts. This discussion is very general and, at places, quite 
speculative. 
2. Truth Telling and Promise Keeping 
Truth telling and promise keeping are separate concepts, but have enough in 
common to be taken together for the purposes of this Article.127 These concepts 
                                                            
would be wrongful.” John Gardner, Corrective Justice, Corrected, 12 DIRITTO & QUESTIONI 
PUBBLICHE 9, 32 (2012); see John Gardner, Torts and Other Wrongs, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
43, 46 (2011).  
 122  Most fundamental doctrines of battery, trespass, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, defamation, contract breach, arson, larceny, etc., are easily enough deontically 
justifiable. 
 123  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977).  
 124  “Because of the fear of fictitious or trivial claims, distrust of the proof offered, and the 
difficulty of setting up any satisfactory boundaries to liability, the law has been slow to afford 
independent protection to the interest in freedom from emotional distress standing alone.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. b (1977). Fair enough, but many other torts are 
also subject to these concerns, especially those where psychic harm is likely.  
 125  The Institute thinks not: “The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, 
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities . . . . There must still be 
freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left through which 
irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.” Id. § 46, cmt. d. There is an 
enormous gap between “trivialities” or “harmless steam” and “extreme and outrageous 
conduct.”  
 126  Id. § 46 (Caveat).  
 127  “A liar and a promise-breaker each use another person. In both speech and promising 
there is an invitation to the other to trust, to make himself vulnerable; the liar and the promise-
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might be interrelated.128 Kant made much of maxims relating to these two 
concepts,129 some of it fundamental to his exposition of practical reason.130 His 
                                                            
breaker then abuse that trust.” CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 16 (1982). “If the truth 
presumption is essential to the well-functioning of rational agents, by-passing it, even for a 
good end, would seem to involve the kind of insult to persons’ status as rational agents that 
morality prohibits.” Barbara Herman, A Mismatch of Methods, in 2 DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT 
MATTERS, supra note 29, at 83, 107. One may put cheating in a nearby, intersecting camp. 
“[C]heating is related to, and differs from, other morally wrongful acts, such as stealing, 
promise-breaking, deceiving, disobedience, and disloyalty.” Stuart P. Green, Cheating, 23 
LAW & PHIL. 137, 137 (2004).  
 128  “G. J. Warnock in Object of Morality argues that the wrong of breaking a promise is 
the wrong of not telling the truth. Why ought I to keep my promise? ‘I ought to do it just 
because I said I would.’” MARK TUNICK, PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 62 n.40 (1998) (citing G. 
J. WARNOCK, THE OBJECT OF MORALITY 101 (1971), and identifying critics, including 
Sidgwick and Atiyah)).  
 129  See KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 37, at 74, 80 (promise keeping). “[S]everal 
philosophers ground promising in the value of autonomy.” Hanoch Sheinman, Introduction: 
Promises and Agreements, in PROMISES AND AGREEMENTS 3, 22 (Hanoch Sheinman ed., 2011) 
(citing Raz, Shiffrin, Robins, and Searle). As for truth telling, “[i]f a declaration made to me is 
knowingly false, my freedom is wrongfully restricted.” WOOD, supra note 34, at 243. “If 
someone is defrauded in a contract, it is not only this person whose right is violated but the 
entire system of contract right, which is structured around the truthfulness of the declarations 
involved in contracts.” Id. But Kant, to Parfit’s chagrin, condemns deceit because “any liar 
‘violates the dignity of humanity in his own person’ . . . .” 1 DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT 
MATTERS 234 (2011) (quoting Kant). “According to [Kant’s] Formula of Humanity, coercion 
and deception are the most fundamental forms of wrongdoing to others – the roots of all evil. 
Coercion and deception violate the conditions of possible assent . . . .” KORSGAARD, supra 
note 35, at 140. “Physical coercion treats someone’s person as a tool; lying treats someone’s 
reason as a tool. This is why Kant finds it so horrifying; it is a direct violation of autonomy.” 
Id. at 141; see id. at 347-48. “An act of fraud has among its wrong-making features that it 
deprives a person of the information he needs to make a rational business decision, and that it 
contributes to general uncertainty and therefore enhances transaction costs in the business life 
of the community.” Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 44 (1992). At one 
place, Kant points in a different direction: “Embezzlement . . . and fraud . . . , when committed 
in such a way that the other could detect it, are private crimes. On the other hand, 
counterfeiting . . . , theft and robbery, and the like are public crimes, because they endanger 
the commonwealth and not just an individual person.” KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra 
note 9, at 372-73. But as Wood and Waldron point out above, third parties are also harmed by 
embezzlement or fraud.  
 130  “Kant’s example of a perfect duty to others concerns a promise you might consider 
making but have no intention of keeping in order to get needed money.” Robert Johnson, 
Kant’s Moral Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 17, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/ (last visited May 8, 2016) (explaining why a 
promise-breaking maxim is not workable).  
  Kant does not ground contract on promise-keeping. “For Kant, a contract is not 
understood as a narrow special case of the more general moral obligation of promise keeping, 
but as a specifically legal institution through which parties vary their respective rights and 
obligations.” RIPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 20-21 (citations omitted). For issues over Kant’s 
claim for promise-keeping, and the relationship of promise-keeping to contract, see B. Sharon 
Byrd & Joachim Hruschka, Kant on “Why Must I Keep My Promise?,” 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
47, 48-53, 71-74 (2006).  
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assertions are occasionally notorious.131 He is commonly thought to have been an 
absolutist about both.132 But this leaves a wrong impression,133 though his views are, 
at times, rather tricky.134 When an unqualified truth telling or promise keeping 
maxim has been adopted, Kant insists that it must always be satisfied.135 But these 
types of maxims may be properly qualified without violating the categorical 
imperative. Qualifications reduce the generality of maxims without inevitably 
undermining their universality. Kant made room for such constrained maxims.136 As 
                                                            
 131  Kant’s most notorious example of required truth telling was in response to a 
hypothetical in which a killer demands to be told by a knowing person where the intended 
victim is. The truth must be told! See IMMANUEL KANT, On a Supposed Right to Lie from 
Philanthropy, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 9, at 605, 611-15. This is hard to cabin. 
The person even seems to be coerced into speaking the truth. For damage control of this 
example, see KORSGAARD, supra note 35, at 133-58 (“The right to lie: Kant on dealing with 
evil”); RIPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 51 n.29; SULLIVAN, supra note 36, at 173-77.  
 132  See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, Deception in Morality and Law, 22 LAW 
& PHIL. 393, 396-97 (2003) (lying).  
 133  “But [unlike “the supreme principle of morality,”] a secondary moral rule or principle, 
whose bindingness on us, when it applies, is categorical, may admit of conditions. For 
instance, in the principle that we should keep our promises, there may be implied conditions 
that would release us from a promise . . . .” WOOD, supra note 34, at 422.  
 134  “The right to communicate your thoughts to others is just a special case of the right to 
use your powers as you see fit. Kant remarks that this extends even to deliberate falsehoods, 
because it is up to others to decide whether to believe what they are told.” RIPSTEIN, supra 
note 15, at 51. Leaving it to others to decide whether to believe what they are told when the 
speaker knows she is telling a lie strikes me as disrespectful. For a discussion that Kant could 
rationalize what seems to be promise-breaking, see SUSAN M. SHELL, KANT AND THE LIMITS OF 
AUTONOMY 249 (2009).  
 135  Regarding “Kant’s conclusion in the case of the argument about false promising, . . . 
coercion and deception obviously violate [the categorical imperative Formula of Humanity] 
because they achieve their end precisely by frustrating or circumventing another person’s 
rational agency and thereby treat the rational nature of the person with obvious disrespect.” 
ALLEN W. WOOD, KANT’S ETHICAL THOUGHT 153 (1999).     
  Kant’s primary example of promise-keeping is where the promisor, at the time of 
making the promise, has the entirely self-interested intention, as she perceives it, not to 
perform. This is promissory fraud, a simultaneous violation of both truth telling (implicitly, “I 
intend to perform”) and promise-keeping. Is the combination multiply worse? What if the 
promisor did have the intention to perform, but circumstances later changed making 
performance very different from what she expected, indeed, required her to sacrifice other 
prima facie duties, such as support of her family?     
  What if a false assertion is not due to the asserter’s blameworthiness? She had, for 
instance, the reasonable, but mistaken belief, in the veracity of the assertion—even all 
authorities at the time believed the assertion was truthful. Should the truth telling maxim 
include a qualification, such that falsehoods are proscribed only if they are “knowing” or 
“intentional”? What about “reckless” or “negligent” falsehoods?  
 136  Kant accepted common courtesies and prudent reserve in expressing one’s opinions. 
See SULLIVAN, supra note 36, at 171-73. “This, then, is what Kant’s view about lying comes 
down to: We may never state outright that we will tell the truth when we have no intention of 
doing so.” Id. at 173.       
   Kant’s “catastrophe” limitation suggests qualifications to otherwise apparently 
absolute maxims. See WOOD, supra note 34, at 240-55 (pointing out that Kant’s requirement 
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a general proposition, a reasonable agent would adopt nearly all, truth telling and 
promise keeping maxims with explicit or implicit exceptions.137 Each of the 
following maxims, though universalized, differs in the degree or direction of its 
generality.  
Setting aside negligent failures to tell the truth,138 consider these plausible truth 
telling maxims.139 First, to accommodate “white” lies: “Tell the truth except when it 
                                                            
of truth telling is not as strict as thought and allows for lies in emergencies). “The right of 
autonomy of individuals is also commonly understood to be qualified by a proviso that 
interference is not required to avert a major disaster or to prevent the violation of other, more 
stringent rights.”THOMAS E. HILL, JR., Autonomy and Benevolent Lies, in AUTONOMY AND 
SELF-RESPECT, supra note 36, at 25, 34.      
  Kant also made exceptions for capital punishment for murder, as where nearly the entire 
citizenry are accomplices (e.g., a rebellion), maternal infanticide, and soldier dueling. See 
KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9, at 475-77.  
 137  In the context of truth telling, see, for example, Herman, supra note 127, at 106-15. 
Particularly censurable are deceptive responses “when (a) the response is a direct lie rather 
than a merely evasive, misleading, or deceptively ambiguous response, (b) the person 
deceived trusts the deceiver and was encouraged to do so, and (c) the lie concerns the life of 
the deceived rather than matters only remotely touching him.” HILL, supra note 136, at 41.  
 138  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) (“Information Negligently 
Supplied for the Guidance of Others”). “Deception generally . . . need not be intentional or 
voluntary, as lying must.” Jonathan E. Adler, Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating, 94 J. 
PHIL. 435, 435 (1997). Even though I give you false information, “I can avoid branded a liar 
by offering an excuse which denies the ‘mental element’ in lying: that I believed the 
information to be true and did not intend to deceive you.” R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY 
AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY 8 (1990). “There is no universally accepted definition of lying to 
others.” James Edwin Mahon, The Definition of Lying and Deception, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL. 2, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lying-definition (last visited May 8, 2016) (citations 
omitted). A “commonly accepted definition . . . is the following: ‘I take a lie to be an 
assertion, the content of which the speaker believes to be false, which is made with the 
intention to deceive the hearer with respect to that content.’” Id. (citing BERNARD WILLIAMS, 
TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS 96 (2002)). For objections to the definition, see id. at 10-12.  
 139  Alexander and Sherwin discuss the meaning and wrong of “lie,” see Alexander & 
Sherwin, supra note 132, at 395-99, as well as the broader concept of “deception,” see id. at 
400-04. “Leading arguments hold either that lying is wrong in itself or that lying results in 
harm that is grave enough to support a near-absolute prohibition.” Id. at 395 (footnote 
omitted). “Law prohibits deception in very broad terms.” Id. at 404 (citation omitted). For the 
limitations of the law’s prohibitions of deception, see id. at 406-15. Overall, the law does not 
“correspond to moral theories that emphasize the effect of deception on the victim’s 
autonomy.” Id. at 432. “There is some controversy as to the relative wrongness of various 
forms of deception. We can distinguish between a statement (lie) that is technically false and 
intended to deceive, a statement that is literally true but is intended to deceive, and a failure to 
disclose relevant information.” Alan Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations, in THE ETHICS 
OF CONSENT 195, 204 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010) (finding the moral 
differences often exaggerated). Like Wertheimer, “I will [largely] set this issue aside.” Id. 
Katz points to “examples in which the manner in which the lie causes the loss quite obviously 
is morally relevant.” Katz, supra note 96, at 314; see also id. at 314-15. One commentator 
mentions “the common moral judgment that lying is in a way worse than other forms of 
deception: the lie is a ‘special affront.’” Collin O’Neil, Lying, Trust, and Gratitude, 40 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 301, 302 (2012). Owens, on the other hand, finds it “doubtful whether being 
given a false belief, even a false belief about matter that interests you, is in itself a harm.” 
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will be gratuitously hurtful.” For social norms relating to niceties, such as “you look 
great” or “your dinner party was scrumptious,” there is typically no expectation of 
sincere, literal truth under the circumstances and no real harm from the falsity, 
instead there are some benefits. In delineating maxims, consequences must be 
weighed. Social norms do not demand or expect truth telling in these situations.140 
Quite the contrary. People are trying not to be disrespectful to the listener or subject 
of these “white” lies. Surely it would be thought gratuitously disrespectful to hurt the 
listener by a truthful, uncomplimentary statement in many social situations. Other 
societies may perceive it differently. If we change the circumstances somewhat, even 
in our society unvarnished truth is demanded, as where the dinner host is relying on 
the evaluation of the food served for purposes of opening a restaurant. Well, even in 
this situation people might want some varnish so long as the indirection or innuendo 
in expressing the truth gently is understood by the host. Manners still count.  
Two other plausible qualifications to truth telling maxims will show how these 
complications can be addressed. First, “tell the truth except when the other party has 
no rightful claim to expect or demand it from you.”141 This handles Kant’s infamous 
hypothetical of a killer demanding to be told where his targeted victim is,142 perhaps 
by creating uncertainty with the penumbral term “rightful.” Second, “tell the truth 
except when it [immediately] puts third parties at [unreasonable, great] risk.” These 
maxims deal with situations in which evildoers, such as terrorists, cyber criminals, or 
the killer in Kant’s hypothetical, would foreseeably and wrongfully exploit facts 
relating to security issues, if known. The word “third” in this second maxim could be 
bracketed to address situations where, say, a person demands to know where her gun 
is located so that she can retrieve it to commit suicide.143  
                                                            
David Owens, The Problem with Promising, in PROMISES AND AGREEMENTS, supra note 129, 
at 58, 61.  
 140  “Intentional deception is a constituent of many acceptable forms of everyday social life, 
such as tact, politeness, excuses, reticence, avoidance, or evasion, which are ways to protect 
privacy, promote social harmony, and encourage interest.” Adler, supra note 138, at 435 
(citation omitted). Kant would go along with this. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
“In contexts in which people usually say false things – for example, when telling stories that 
are jokes – we are not deceived. If a story that is a joke and is false counts as a lie we can say 
that a lie in this case in [sic] not wrong . . . .” KORSGAARD, supra note 35, at 136. “Socially 
appropriate lying is not merely tolerated, it is mandatory. The child who fails to master the 
skill pays the heavy price of disapproval, punishment, and social ostracism.” DAVID L. SMITH, 
WHY WE LIE 18 (2004).  
 141  Other commentators have advanced this “right to truth” idea. See Mahon, supra note 
138, at 17-20.  
 142  See supra note 130.  
 143  “[M]ost of us think that there are some cases in which benevolent lies are permissible.” 
KORSGAARD, supra note 35, at 348. But Korsgaard asserts that justification of benevolent lies 
“must . . . appeal to the lack of autonomy of the person lied to,” which requires “some criteria 
for determining who is autonomous. But here we run into a difficulty. Autonomy in the 
ordinary sense appears to be a matter of degree.” Id. at 350.    
  All of the qualifications within these three plausible maxims may fit with the “special 
justification” limitations in Scanlon’s “principle forbidding lying”: “One may not, in the 
absence of special justification, act with the intention of leading someone to form a false 
belief about some matter, or with the aim of confirming a false belief he or she already holds.” 
T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 318 (2000). Scanlon’s principle “forbids 
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Turning to promise-keeping maxims, consider these.144 First, “keep promises 
except when other prima facie moral duties are weightier under the circumstances.” 
This applies when, for example, an agent who is rushing to keep a promised 
appointment on time comes upon a person in dire need of a time-consuming rescue. 
Another example is where a gratuitous promise to grant future resources to another 
person, if kept, would prevent the promisor from substantially meeting her familial 
duties. As stated, however, this broad maxim qualifier (“weightier under the 
circumstances”) seems too open-ended. More detailed explication is required to 
sharpen autonomy boundaries and guide conduct. The qualification is expressed as a 
standard, whereas refined rules may be better. In practice, this broad standard might 
serve as a meta-maxim to be honed by more specific “except when” provisos as 
moral dilemmas are anticipated or arise. This could get very complex. 
“Keep promises except when the performance [, unforeseeably at the time of the 
promise,] will be [unreasonably, extremely] harmful to the promisee or others.” Akin 
to the prior suicide example, these qualifications would excuse a promissory 
commitment to temporarily keep a gun for the promisee when she asks for its return 
while in an agitated or depressed state, having threatened to kill herself or others 
with it. These general, standard-laden, qualified maxims remain subsumed by the 
meta-maxim above.  
When transgressing a general truth-telling or promise-keeping maxim, the 
violator may not be using another person as means only to her own ends.145 She may 
not be curtailing another person’s overall security or liberty. Beneficent paternalism 
and “white” lies are both examples. They are aimed at boosting another person’s net 
welfare.146 Nevertheless, some such violations may be disrespectful of the other 
                                                            
more than lying, since one can act with the aim of leading another to form a false belief 
without saying anything that one believes to be false.” Id. See generally HILL, supra note 136, 
at 25.  
 144  “Moral philosophers disagree not only as to the grounds and scope of promissory 
duties, but also as to just what a promise is.” Gregory Klass, Promise Etc., 45 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 695, 699 (2012) (distinguishing between narrow and broad conceptions). “A promise in 
[Klass’s preferred] narrow sense is the expression of an intent to undertake a moral obligation 
by the very communication of that intent.” Id. “It is this narrow sense of ‘promise’ that makes 
promising the paradigm of a normative power, and which makes promises so important for 
autonomy theories.” Id. at 700. Not all promises and promise-related assertions are the same. 
Ayres and Klass identify “three categories of promissory representations” (positive, opaque, 
and blank) and three “representations relative to some fixed probability” (definite-probability, 
fully warranting, and semi-warranting). IAN AYERS & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES 
44-45 (2005). “Promise something that you intend not to do is not just a tort, subject to 
punitive damages, but can also be a crime.” Id. at 170 (“theft by deception”, “obtaining money 
or property by means of false or fraudulent . . . promises”). The “history of criminal seduction 
. . . does demonstrate that the law has been willing to impose punitive sanctions for promises 
that would not be enforceable through an action in contract.” Id. at 193.  
 145  By “another person” I am referring to the third parties as well as the recipient of the 
communication. Lies work because most people tell the truth. Therefore, “it is not just the 
person to whom you lie that you treat as a means, but all of those who tell the truth . . . . 
[Relying on their truth telling] is explicitly treating their rational nature as a mere means: 
indeed it is making a tool of other people’s good wills.” KORSGAARD, supra note 35, at 127.  
 146  Lahav gives examples of when promissory obligations should be released and then 
advances a general principle: “Where the promisee’s consent to breach is implied but not 
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person’s dignity.147 Promise-breaking motivated by beneficent paternalism denies 
the paternalized person the liberty to choose for herself, and the security from being 
treated as less than a fully rational, ethical being.148 While the promise-breaker may 
consider the promisee a moral equal, she does not treat her respectfully. A “white” 
lie may signal the view that the listener cannot bear up under the weight of the bald 
truth. Social niceties are one thing, but even “white” lies aimed at psychic benefits 
may be contextually demeaning. 
Qualified truth-telling and promise-keeping maxims effectively expand the 
liberty of the asserter or promisor at the cost, oftentimes, of reducing the security of 
another person. Sometimes, though, the security of the other person may also be 
expanded in some sense, as where permissible “white” lies increase one’s security 
from gratuitous psychic harm. This trajectory of analysis suggests a slippery slope 
reasoning with the strong prospect of total paternalism at the bottom. In balancing 
liberty and security interests, it is critical to keep the importance of respect in sight at 
all times. 
3. Reliance and Expectations  
Disappointment of a person’s reliance or expectations commonly produces 
harms.149 Reliance and expectation damages for contract breach are exemplary. 
                                                            
express, the promisee’s autonomy is nevertheless respected because two conditions are 
satisfied: (1) the promisee would have consent to the breach, and (2) the breach was motivated 
by the promisee’s interests.” Gil Lahav, A Principle of Justified Promise-Breaking and Its 
Application to Contract Law, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 163, 169 (2000). “I suggest here 
that breach may often be seen as moral, once one appreciates that contracts are incompletely 
detailed agreements and that breach may be committed in problematic contingencies that were 
not explicitly addressed by the governing contracts.” Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract 
May not Be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1569 
(2009); see Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439 (2006).  
 147  “But lying also, perhaps less obviously, trespasses autonomy where a lie is told in order 
to foster autonomy, especially if the desire effect is achieved. That its offensive character may 
be blunted does not alter the autonomy-robbing function of the lie.” MARINA OSHANA, 
PERSONAL AUTONOMY IN SOCIETY 111 (2006) (referring to paternalistic intervention). 
Nonetheless, “I believe a case can be made that strong paternalistic intervention is sometimes 
needed to preserve the autonomy that is threatened by a competent and deserving person’s 
self-regarding conduct, even where the target of the paternalistic gesture has not behaved in 
ways that clearly permit infringements of autonomy.” Id. at 115. For justification, see id. at 
115-17. Relatedly, Schwartzman argues that insincere political arguments are contrary to “to 
the values of mutual respect and political legitimacy.” Micah Schwartzman, The Sincerity of 
Public Reason, 19 J. POL. PHIL. 375, 398 (2011).  
 148  “[A]utonomy is the good which paternalism fails to respect.” Marina A.L. Oshana, 
Personal Autonomy and Society, 29 J. SOC. PHIL. 81, 82 (1998).  
 149  “Few hurts which human beings can sustain are greater, and none wound more, than 
when that on which they habitually and with full assurance relied, fails them in the hour of 
need; . . . none excite more resentment, either in the person suffering, or in a sympathizing 
spectator.” MILL, Utilitarianism, supra note 95, at 75.     
   While Corbin puts the protection of reasonable expectations at the center of contract 
law, see 1 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1, at 2 (Joseph M. Perillo rev. ed. 
1993) (“The Main Purpose of Contract Law Is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations 
Induced by Promises”), Owen would center it in tort law as well. “As in contract law, one 
naturally focuses initially on the expectations of victims in security from harm.” David G. 
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These are typically to rectify wrongful economic harms. In addition, tort law 
provides examples where frustrating reliance can produce wrongful physical, 
economic, and psychic harms. For example, where a person reasonably relies on a 
railroad to continue providing a crossing guard,150 or on the government to operate a 
lighthouse non-negligently.151 Dignitary harms may also ensue in these 
circumstances. A person may reasonably be insulted by a transparently weak excuse 
for breaking a non-promissory commitment (“I would have come to your house for 
the weekly card game, but I forgot to get money.”). When, then, should the 
disappointment of reliance or expectations be declared wrongful harms by means of 
deontic maxims? 
Reliance or expectations need not be linked to truth-telling or promise-keeping 
maxims.152 For example, suppose a person relies on another person’s statement, “I 
plan to make a substantial investment in this new company.” While truthful when 
asserted, the speaker later changes her mind before or after the time the listener relies 
on the statement by investing in the new company herself.153 Reliance or 
expectations maxims, on the other hand, may provide the foundation for truth-telling 
or promise-keeping maxims.154 Ronald Dworkin champions this view:  
                                                            
Owen, Expectations in Tort, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1287, 1289 (2011). Noting that reasonable 
expectations also drive property law, Owen observes, “[e]xpectations might preliminarily be 
viewed as twin pillars of tort, then, because we robustly count the expectations of both actors 
and victims alike.” Id. at 1289-90 (citation omitted). Pound also puts the protection of 
reasonable expectations at the center of the law. See ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 188-89 (1922); ROSCOE POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 3, 5-6, 
17, 28-31 (1951).  
 150  See Erie R.R. Co. v. Stewart, 40 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1930).  
 151  See Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955). See generally RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 42 (2011). 
 152  See AYERS & KLASS, supra note 144, at 203.  
 153  Dworkin argues that even if the statement is true when asserted, if it later becomes false 
(e.g., by cancelling a commitment to attend a conference) one harms another person whose 
expectations were aroused by being told of the commitment, whether or not she relied on it, 
and has the responsibility not to do so. See DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 305-08. Scanlon 
embraces the “principle of Loss Prevention”: 
If one has intentionally or negligently led someone to expect that one is going to 
follow a certain course of action, X, and one has good reason to believe that that 
person will suffer significant loss as a result of this expectation if one does not follow 
X, then one must take reasonable steps to prevent that loss.  
SCANLON, supra note 143, at 300-01. For challenges to Scanlon’s position, see JOHN DEIGH, 
EMOTIONS, VALUES, AND THE LAW 184-95 (2008). Cf. Stephen A. Smith, Performance, 
Punishment and the Nature of Contractual Obligation, 60 MOD. L. REV. 360, 368 (1997) 
(observing there is no contractual obligation for the types of assertions discussed by Dworkin 
and Scanlon).  
 154  For the debate over whether the duty of promise keeping is grounded on social 
practices, thereby implying a (partial) grounding in reliance and expectation maxims, or is an 
independent moral obligation, see TUNICK, supra note 128, at 50-54. Those declaring the 
obligation independent of social practices include Kant, Locke, Grotius, McNeilly, Downie, 
MacCormick, and Scanlon, while those disagreeing include Hume, H.L.A. Hart, Rawls, 
Melden, Prichard, Hamlyn, Anscombe, Pitkin, and Searle. See id. For example, Tunick 
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Promising is not an independent source of a distinct kind of moral duty. 
Rather it plays an important but not exclusive role in fixing the scope of a 
more general responsibility: not to harm other people by first encouraging 
them to expect that we will act in a certain way and then not acting in that 
way. That general responsibility is itself a case of the even more general 
responsibility . . . to respect the dignity of others and in that way to 
respect our own dignity.155  
Dworkin makes a similar argument for truth telling grounded on respect for 
dignity.156  
This section examines a sampling of plausible reliance and expectations maxims 
from broad to narrow. This exercise is to preliminarily reckon the reasonability of 
adopting such maxims. It overlooks myriad relevant factors that would bear on 
specifics. Thus, needed “except when” clauses are neglected.157 While I put together 
reliance and expectations in the maxims for the sake of expediency, surely one 
would usually adopt maxims that separate them out, as under the existing law where 
reliance often receives more protection than “mere” expectations. Or, the 
substantive, first-order maxims may cover the two together, but the requital, second-
order maxims may distinguish them, or both.  
 “Do not disappoint another person’s reliance or expectations.” This maxim is too 
general to realistically be considered for adoption.158 It severely sacrifices liberty for 
the sake of very expansive security. As one example, owing to human nature, a 
person’s hope for aid or support from others, perhaps unreasonable or even 
desperate, is too easily aroused and ripened into reliance or expectations to warrant 
blanket claims against those other persons. 
                                                            
identifies MacCormick’s conditions for an obligation to keep a promise, which are 
independent of social practices: “A. You rely on me doing x; B. You would suffer if I did not 
do x; and C. I knowingly or intentionally induced you to rely on my doing x . . . .” Id. at 58. 
See Neil MacCormick & Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, 46 PROC. 
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 59, 59-78 (1972).  
 155  DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 304. Notice Dworkin’s mention of dignity. Dworkin 
follows Scanlon in adopting an expectations justification for promise keeping. See id. at 307 
(quoting Scanlon’s “principle of fidelity”). In Scanlon’s own words, “The account I will offer 
[regarding ‘the obligation to keep a promise and other related obligations’] describes such 
obligations as one special case of a wider category of duties and obligations regarding the 
expectations that we lead others to form about what we intend to do.” SCANLON, supra note 
143, at 295. See id. at 295-327. For critiques of Scanlon’s “expectationalism”, see Allen 
Habib, Promises, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 29-31, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/promises/ (last visited May 8, 2016).  
 156  “If you were lying [to me] . . . then you have harmed me just in that act. Dignity 
explains why . . . .” DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 305. “You harm me when you lie to me even 
if your lie makes no further difference because I don’t believe you, or because your lie makes 
no difference to what I do, or because I suffer no further harm in acting on it.” Id.  
 157  The examples discussed above of exceptions to broad promise-keeping maxims to 
account for unexpected rescue delays and family obligations could likewise apply to reliance 
and expectations maxims. See discussion supra note 144. 
 158  “Someone who relies upon a promise made to someone else . . . acquires no right by 
doing so.” STEVENS, supra note 41, at 15.  
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“Do not [foreseeably] disappoint another person’s reasonable reliance or 
expectations that you have aroused.” Reasonable, foreseeable reliance or 
expectations may result from a bare, legally unenforceable promise or a mere 
express or implied statement.159 The word “reasonable” may suggest a focus of 
foreseeability not on the arouser or purported invader, but rather on the arousee, the 
supposed invadee. Yet it is less reasonable for an arousee to rely on an arouser’s 
communication if she foresees that the arouser cannot reasonably foresee the 
arousee’s reliance.160 Reasonable foreseeability is relevant for both arousee and 
arouser. Blameworthiness, both responsibility and disrespect, emphasizes this. 
Foreseeability is commonly an element of a claim for the protection of reliance or 
expectations under existing law,161 as in the doctrine of promissory estoppel.162 The 
reasonability of reliance is usually situated or framed by norms, such as legal or 
moral principles, social mores and practices, that give meaning to statements or 
conduct.163 The topic of norms is discussed below. 
 “Do not foreseeably disappoint reasonable reliance or expectations that you 
arouse by a communication meant for the particular arousee.” This is an example of 
a narrowed maxim designed to limit third-party claims. Protection of unreasonable 
reliance or expectations, of sorts, may also be morally justified in particular 
circumstances, as when the arouser knows that the arousee is unaware of a trumping 
norm (e.g., a statute) that frees the arouser from legal liability. Likewise when the 
arouser knows that the arousee is acting under severe constraints (e.g., coercive 
desperation). Account may be taken for situations in which the arouser becomes 
aware of the reliance or expectations sometime after the triggering 
communication.164 Perhaps some such accounts should be limited by a narrow 
requital maxim. For example, “reasonably caution an arousee who may be 
                                                            
 159  Scanlon advances “the principle of Due Care”: “One must exercise due care not to lead 
others to form reasonable but false expectations about what one will do when one has good 
reason to believe that they would suffer significant loss as a result of relying on these 
expectations.” SCANLON, supra note 143, at 300.  
 160  “The foreseeable possibility of detriment, whether by the reliance of the claimant or a 
third party, is relevant and will commonly be decisive in determining whether, as a matter of 
construction, the defendant has by his actions implicitly assumed responsibility towards the 
claimant.” STEVENS, supra note 41, at 14.  
 161  For example, “[a] misrepresentation is material if it would be likely to induce a 
reasonable person to manifest his assent, or if the maker knows that it would be likely to 
induce the recipient to do so.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(2) (1981).  
 162  See id. § 90 (1981). “[P]romissory-fraud actions might lie not only in the cases where 
promissory estoppel is accompanied by misrepresentations of intent but also where even 
without promise, a speaker’s non-promissory prediction of the future misrepresents the 
speaker’s true intent.” AYERS & KLASS, supra note 144, at 145.  
 163  “Come on back now, you hear,” may be a casual farewell nicety in some communities, 
but a true invitation elsewhere. See generally Bailey Kuklin, The Plausibility of Legally 
Protecting Reasonable Expectations, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 19 (1997).  
 164  Such accounts might cover cases outside the reach of the next considered deontic 
boundary marker, exploitation, since here the arouser expects or desires no advantage from the 
arousee’s reliance and expectations. Nevertheless, there may be common features to the 
exploitation maxims, as where the arousee is acting under partial ignorance or coercion.  
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foreseeably disappointed by unreasonable reliance or expectations that you arouse by 
a communication meant for her.”165 
There is a multitude of plausible reliance and expectations maxims. The adoption 
of any particular maxim within the limits of the categorical imperative is supposedly 
optional.166 Though perhaps optional, it strikes me as unlikely that a reasonable, 
sensible agent would reject all forms of reliance and expectations maxims. At the 
extremes, altogether unprotected reliance or expectations would severely impact 
both liberty and security interests. Especially when knowing or purposive, a 
disappointed arousal may be disrespectful. Disappointment may involve use of the 
arousee as a means only. Perhaps a survivalist living alone in the wilderness would 
reject all such maxims, but not the rest of us.  
4. Exploitation (Advantage-taking)  
The foundational assumption that moral and legal agents, owing to their rational 
nature, are responsible for their choices and conduct is often put to the test when it 
comes to exploitation or advantage taking.167 Circumstances facilitating exploitation 
are ones in which the exploitee is making a choice under some degree of ignorance 
or coercion, internal (e.g., cognitive dissonance, impulse) or external (e.g., fraud, 
economic duress).168 Her choice is impaired.169 The exploitee, nevertheless, may not 
                                                            
 165  Cf. TINALEA (“This is not a legally enforceable agreement”) clauses; see AYERS & 
KLASS, supra note 144, at 157-58.  
 166  See generally Johnson, supra note 130.  
 167  “In the moralized sense used here, exploitation is generally understood as taking unfair 
advantage.” RUTH J. SAMPLE, EXPLOITATION 7 (2003) (citation omitted). “To characterize an 
action as exploitative is to commit oneself to a substantive moral view since, as Joel Feinberg 
has noted, the essence of exploitation is ‘a way of using another person that is somehow 
wrongful or unfair.’” MICHAEL J. GORR, COERCION, FREEDOM AND EXPLOITATION 8 (1989) 
(quoting Joel Feinberg, Noncoercive Exploitation, in PATERNALISM 201, 202 (Rolf Sartorius 
ed., 1983)). Wertheimer is less sure. “[W]hereas the moral force of coercion is relatively clear, 
as a coerced agreement is not binding, the moral force of exploitation is not clear, for it is not 
obvious what follows from characterizing an agreement as exploitative.” Alan Wertheimer, 
Remarks on Coercion and Exploitation, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 889, 894 (1997).  
 168  That exploitation does not require coercion, see SAMPLE, supra note 167, at 11-12. 
“Whereas coercion refers to the formation of an agreement, exploitation seems to always 
include reference to the substance or outcome of an agreement.” Wertheimer, supra note 167, 
at 896. Gorr distinguishes “incapacity” exploitation from “circumstantial” exploitation. See 
GORR, supra note 167, at 151.  
 169  For example, the German Civil Code provides: 
[A] legal transaction is void by which a person, by exploiting the predicament, 
inexperience, lack of sound judgment or considerable weakness of will of another, 
causes himself or a third party, in exchange for an act of performance, to be promised 
or granted pecuniary advantages which are clearly disproportionate to the 
performance.” 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Role of Fault in Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected 
Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, and Nonperformance, in FAULT IN AMERICAN 
CONTRACT LAW 82, 86-87 (Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat eds., 2010) (quoting Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, as amended, § 138(2) (F.R.G.) (emphasis 
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suffer physical, economic, or psychic harm from the exploitation.170 She may even 
be benefitted in these senses, as where she is enticed to enter into a contract that nets 
more gains than otherwise obtainable.171 But in one sense, one key to my exposition, 
the exploitee is harmed—her dignity is not respected.172 Sometimes she is used as a 
means only.173 Even when the exploitee benefits, perhaps more than does the 
exploiter,174 she still suffers a dignitary harm. She is not treated with respect. She has 
deontic reason to object.175  
Some issues of exploitation may fall within the province of substantive maxims 
about truth telling or promise keeping. Where an agent’s impaired choice results 
from deceit or the violation of a duty to disclose, truth telling is implicated.176 If an 
                                                            
added). Sample argues that exploitation does not require vulnerability. See SAMPLE, supra 
note 167, at 27-54.  
 170  In recent years, mutually beneficial exploitation has drawn most of the philosophical 
attention. “[Harmful] exploitation has not received much attention, partly, I suspect, because 
its wrongfulness has seemed obvious, and therefore philosophically uninteresting, and partly 
because the wrongfulness of such actions can usually be explained by reference to some other 
less controversial and obscure moral concept such as coercion or deception.” Matt Zwolinski, 
Book Review, 121 ETHICS 228, 228 (2010).  
 171  “Exploitation can occur even when the exploited party benefits from, and would 
voluntarily consent to, the transaction. She may gain more than her exploiter.” Matthew 
Rendall, Non-identity, Sufficiency and Exploitation, 19 J. POL. PHIL. 229, 237 (2011). 
“Exploitation may not fall within the harm principle because the ‘victim’ is not harmed but is 
inadequately benefited . . . . Yet arguably, each of these types of conduct is immoral.” 
Alexander, supra note 107, at 855. For a taxonomy of exploitation, see Wertheimer, supra 
note 167, at 897-99.  
 172  “On my account relationships can be voluntary, noncoerced, and even mutually 
beneficial and yet may be subject to the moral criticism that they are exploitative. The badness 
stems from the degradation of one or more of the agents in a transaction for advantage.” 
SAMPLE, supra note 167, at 5. Sample refers to her “account of exploitation” as “Exploitation 
as Degradation.” Id. at 56.  
 173  If the advantaged agent does nothing to induce the choice by the disadvantaged one, as 
where she passively accepts an offered gratuity based on known misinformation, it seems that 
she is using the other agent as a means only in, at best, a weak sense.  
 174  “Much exploitation is, paradoxically, mutually beneficial. This accommodates the fact 
that moral agents can fail to demonstrate respect for persons not simply in the course of 
harming them, but also when improving their situation . . . .” SAMPLE, supra note 167, at 57. 
Even in some of these cases, as where the exploitee agrees to a contract beneficial to her, she 
may have been able to capture more of the consumer surplus if her choice was not impaired. 
But because the exploited person may benefit, Sample argues, “Much exploitation seems to be 
activity with which we should not interfere.” Id. at 86. One reason is that “the consequences 
for the exploited person are often worse if he is not exploited.” Id.  
 175  Recent philosophical examinations of exploitation have two foci: “[T]he former 
focuses on the fairness or unfairness of the transaction, while the latter bases its assessment on 
a broadly Kantian idea of respect for persons. Both of these approaches, in turn, admit of 
specification in a broad variety of ways.” Matt Zwolinski, Structural Exploitation, 29(1) SOC. 
PHIL. & POL’Y 154, 157 (Winter 2012) (footnote omitted).  
 176  Against the right to take advantage of another’s ignorance of material facts, Trebilcock 
observes, “It may be plausible to argue that the buyer’s conduct violates the Kantian 
categorical imperative of equal concern and respect in that if the roles were reversed . . . , the 
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exploitee waives an exploiter’s promissory obligation because of her impaired 
condition, then promise keeping is implicated, whether or not the exploiter causes 
the impairment. Other exploitation circumstances may fall within the province of 
reliance or expectations maxims. Such maxims, for example, may protect 
unreasonable reliance or expectations induced or taken advantage of by an exploiter 
aware of the other party’s impaired condition.177 These other types of maxims, 
however, will not do all the work of protecting against exploitation in all its forms. 
Since choices are perhaps always somewhat impaired, and other agents may 
benefit from the impairments whether or not they induced them, or were even aware 
of them, the adoption of plausible exploitation maxims must settle difficult questions 
about where to draw this autonomy space boundary line.178 First, exploitation 
advantage taking is: “At the most general level, A exploits B when A takes unfair 
advantage of B . . . . One problem with such a broad account . . . is that there will ‘be 
as many competing conceptions of exploitation as theories of what persons owe to 
each other by way of fair treatment.’”179 This section briefly explores some tenable 
conceptions, looking down various avenues.180  
                                                            
buyer would not wish his ignorance to be exploited by the seller in this fashion . . . .” 
MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 117 (1993). Fried agrees that 
taking advantage of another’s ignorance for one’s own economic gain is disrespectful. See 
FRIED, supra note 127, at 78-79. In response, one commentator notes, “There is, in the context 
of pre-contractual bargaining, a variety of plausible conceptions of what respect for persons 
requires. For instance, it is plausible to recognize a significant line between fraudulent 
misrepresentation and non-disclosure of material facts.” Marc Ramsay, The Buyer/Seller 
Asymmetry: Corrective Justice and Material Non-Disclosure, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 115, 135 
(2006). As discussed in the next paragraph, I agree with Ramsay.  
  Purposive deceit for one’s own purposes is, of course, far out of bounds. It uses another 
person merely for one’s own ends. “Taking all forms of injustice into account, none is more 
deadly than that practiced by people who act as if they are good men when they are being 
most treacherous.” CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 23 (Harry G. Edinger trans., 1974) (44 B.C.E.). The 
Lilliputians, Swift reports, “look upon fraud as a greater crime than theft . . . ; for they allege, 
that care and vigilance, with a very common understanding, may preserve a man’s goods from 
thieves, but honesty has no defense against superior cunning . . . .” AYERS & KLASS, supra 
note 144, at 176-77 (quoting JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER’S TRAVELS 48-49 (Arthur Case ed., 
1938) (1726)).  
 177  Disappointed reliance or expectations may not involve exploitation or using the invadee 
as a means only, as where the arouser did not intend, expect or actually gain anything from the 
arousee’s behavior.  
 178  “Some commentators have suggested that the rules of what does (and does not) 
constitute duress can best be seen as a set of collective choices regarding what sort of 
‘advantage taking’ or ‘strategic behavior’ we will condone (or even encourage) in transactions 
. . . .” Brian H. Bix, Contracts, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT, supra note 139, at 251, 257-58. 
Kronman would allow advantage taking so long as “the welfare of most people who are taken 
advantage of in a particular way be increased by the kind of advantage-taking in question.” 
Anthony Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 487 (1980) 
(footnote omitted). 
 179  Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 4, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/exploitation/ (last visited May 8, 2016) (reference omitted) 
(sampling accounts of exploitation at 4-7). “Some accounts invoke the Kantian notion that one 
wrongfully exploits when one treats another instrumentally or merely as a means.” Id. at 7. 
“On some accounts, the exploited party must be harmed, . . . the exploited party may gain 
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 “Do not accept benefits ensuing from another person’s [foreseeable] 
[substantial] shortfall from the conditions for fully [reasonably, substantially] 
responsible [autonomous] choice.” Under these maxims, to produce a wrongful 
harm, an exploiter need not be a source of the exploitee’s condition of impaired 
choice.181 Without the exploiter’s involvement in the exploitee’s impairment, some 
courts and commentators insist these maxims go too far toward protecting the 
exploitee’s security interest,182 while others disagree.183 
                                                            
from the relationship, . . . the exploited party must be coerced, . . . [there must be] a defect in 
the quality of the consent, . . . exploitation can be fully voluntary.” Id. at 7. For the 
“definitional landscape” of “exploitation”, see ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 10-12 
(1996).  
  “[W]hat is a ‘desperate vulnerability’ and what is it to ‘exploit’ or ‘unjustly exploit’ or 
‘shamefully exploit’ such a vulnerability? . . . Even given our likely agreement on extreme 
cases, however, there is little hope that we could formulate some neat and simple rule to make 
formal determinations for all cases.” Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion, and Hard 
Choices, 67 VA. L. REV. 79, 89 (1981) (looking to the contract doctrine of unconscionability 
for “hints”).  
 180  The extent to which foreseeability should be part of the maxims is generally addressed 
above in the examination of reliance and expectation maxims. See discussion supra Part 
IV.A.3.  
 181  “Genuinely pure exploitation can occur only in cases in which the offeror does no more 
than take advantage of a pre-existing incapacity.” GORR, supra note 167, at 152. “‘Exploiters 
are typically opportunists, they extract advantage from situations that are not of their own 
making. Coercers, on the other hand, are typically makers, rather than mere discoverers and 
users, of opportunities.’” Id. at 155 (quoting Joel Feinberg, Noncoercive Exploitation, in 
PATERNALISM 201, 208 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983)).  
 182  Regarding coercion, as to whether a risk has been assumed voluntarily, “it does not 
matter that the plaintiff is coerced to assume the risk by some force not emanating from 
defendant, such as poverty, dearth of living quarters, or a sense of moral responsibility.” 
Gibson v. Beaver, 226 A.2d 273, 276 (Md. 1967) (quoting 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING 
JAMES, JR., TORTS §  21.3 (1956)). “[T]he pressure of commercial or economic necessities in 
no wise caused by the wrongful act of him who seeks to profit by them . . . will not render his 
act in so utilizing his neighbor’s distress for his own advantage legally wrongful.” Francis H. 
Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REV. 14, 25 (1906). “True coercion, to put 
it crudely, requires not merely an unhappy choice but a villain who is responsible for creating 
the necessity of making that choice.” Murphy, supra note 179, at 87; see Hila Keren, 
Consenting Under Stress, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 684 (2013); Zwolinski, supra note 175, at 
155 (“[C]onsideration of background injustices [should] play [a fairly little role] in the correct 
understanding of exploitation.”).  
 183  Consent to otherwise tortious conduct resulting from a substantial mistake concerning 
the nature or expected extent of the invasion is invalid when “the mistake is known to the 
other or is induced by the other’s misrepresentation . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
892B(2) (1977) (emphasis added). Though a party’s constrained choice is not due to an 
advantage-taker, “it seems clear that if such circumstances were known and advantage taken 
of them by the other party a degree of pressure which would not ordinarily amount to duress, 
might have such coercive effect as to invalidate a transaction.” 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, 
CONTRACTS § 1608 (rev. ed. 1937) (footnote omitted). The term “exploit”, like “take 
advantage”, suggests at least an awareness, or reason to know, by the exploiter of the 
exploitee’s impaired condition. For duress, the general rule grants relief for third-party 
coercion “unless the other party to the transaction in good faith and without reason to know of 
the duress either gives value or relies materially on the transaction.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981). Feinberg “conclude[s] that coercive offers made in 
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“Do not [foreseeably, purposely] undermine [substantially, unreasonably] the 
conditions for [fully] responsible [autonomous] choice of another person and then 
[unduly] exploit her impaired choice.” If ever exploitation would be seen as 
producing a wrongful harm, it would be under maxims such as these. The exploiter 
is not the least bit respectful of the exploitee’s dignity and would likely be using her 
as a means only. Legal doctrines reaching this conduct, include fraud, deceit, duress, 
coercion, and undue influence.  
“Do not [purposely, intentionally, foreseeably] undermine [substantially, 
unreasonably] the conditions for [fully] responsible [autonomous] choice of another 
person.” These maxims, while broader than the ones immediately above, may be 
abridged without the violator gaining any advantage from the violation. It would not 
seem, therefore, that the violator is necessarily using the disadvantaged person as a 
means only, but such conduct may still be disrespectful by not treating the person as 
an end in herself,184 and may affect the person’s liberty and security interests in her 
later impaired dealings with others. Still, when the violator gains nothing, she is not 
an exploiter in the usual sense. Is there a sufficient dignitary harm before the 
disadvantaged person chooses conduct influenced by her impaired condition? When 
requital by the maxim violator is called for, should she be responsible for harms to 
the disadvantaged person caused in part by interactions with third parties? If so, 
should this protection be limited to cases in which the third party is not herself an 
exploiter? In answering these and other questions relating to exploitation, 
reasonable, principled, people can certainly disagree with one another. 
5. Risk Imposition 
When an agent’s conduct puts another person at risk,185 does the risk by itself 
harm the other person? This depends, to begin with, on what is meant by a risk.186 
                                                            
circumstances deliberately created by the offeror for the purposes of exploitation do normally 
invalidate consent, whereas coercive offers made by a party who had no role in creating the 
circumstances of vulnerability . . . very often do not invalidate consent.” JOEL FEINBERG, 
HARM TO SELF 246 (1986); see id. at 176, 197.  
 184  The failure to respect a person as an end in herself is different from using her as a 
means only. See F.M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS 13 (2007); MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY 81-85 
(2012); SCANLON, supra note 87, at 89-121 (“Means and Ends”).  
 185  “There is no form of activity (or inactivity either for that matter) that does not involve 
some risk.” FEINBERG, supra note 183, at 101.  
 186  “Risk is defined as a situation in which numerical probabilities can be attached to the 
various possible outcomes of each course of action . . . .” JON ELSTER, Introduction, in 
RATIONAL CHOICE 1, 5 (Jon Elster ed., 1986). “There are famously different interpretations of 
the notion of risk. Dividing these interpretations into two rough categories, we can say there 
are objective and subjective accounts of risk.” Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. 
L. REV. 963, 972-73 (2003) (footnote omitted). As examples of Finkelstein’s categories, see 
Alexander, supra note 107, at 825 (“Risk is an epistemic rather than an ontic notion, and it is 
always assessed from a particular informational perspective.”); Larry Alexander, Insufficient 
Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 931, 936 (2000) 
(“Risk is always relative to someone’s perspective, a perspective that is defined by possession 
of certain information but not other information.”). See generally Sven O. Hansson, Risk, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/risk/ (last visited May 8, 2016). 
Feinberg identifies risk within the harm principle as a compound of the magnitude and 
probability of harm. See FEINBERG, supra note 18, at 191.  
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The first definition of “risk” in Black’s Law Dictionary is edifying: “The uncertainty 
of a result, happening, or loss; the chance of injury, damage, or loss; esp., the 
existence and extent of the possibility of harm . . . .”187 “Injury”, “damage”, and 
“loss” are normally associated with harm, though not necessarily wrongful harm.188 
If we focus on “[t]he uncertainty of a result, happening,”  it does not appear that the 
creation of a risk needs to be harmful in itself. For instance, when an agent attempts 
to effectuate a rescue of another person, there is typically some risk, some chance, 
that the agent will fail. This uncertainty does not necessarily produce a harm to the 
rescuee, a setback to her overall interests. In a strong sense, the risky rescue attempt 
promotes the rescuee’s interests. The rescue attempt has features of both a setback to 
a particular interest and a promotion of the same or another interest. A carefully 
hurled lifebuoy may hit the rescuee and injure her. Whether or not it injures her, the 
lifebuoy may also save her life. Is, then, the creation of a risk from hurling the 
lifebuoy a harm to her? Yes, and no. It depends on how we characterize the chancy 
action. We may speak in broad terms, “is a risky rescue attempt (for which there is 
no better alternative) harmful to the rescuee?” Put this way, the answer, at least when 
the chance of succeeding at the rescue outweighs the chance of making things worse, 
is no. We may be more specific and deconstruct the conduct, one aspect being, “is 
the risk that a hurled lifebuoy will hit a rescuee harmful to her?” Put this way 
without more, it is easy to answer yes. In this context, the broader characterization of 
the risk seems more normatively appropriate. This gambit of telescoping an 
identified risk may be referred to as “the specificity of risk characterization.”189 In a 
                                                            
  With regard to “imposing a risk”, “risk must be conceived in an objective rather than in 
an epistemic sense, and it must generally be regarded as the joint creation of two interacting 
actors or activities rather than as something that one person has unilaterally imposed upon 
another.” Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 27, at 74 (reference omitted). As 
Perry notes, this suggests the Coase Theorem. See id. at 85-86; Ronald Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). What-is-a-risk-of-what?  
 187  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1353 (8th ed. 2004).  
 188  “In non-technical contexts, the word ‘risk’ refers, often rather vaguely, to situations in 
which it is possible but not certain that some undesirable event will occur.” Hansson, supra 
note 186, at 1. “Injury” has been defined as a harm that is legally protected against, meaning, a 
wrongful harm. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (1979) (“Injury and Harm”).  
 189  The idea stems from Judge Magruder’s discussion in Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604, 
610 (1st Cir. 1955) (“Flexibility [in “decid[ing] each of an infinite variety of cases”] is . . . 
preserved by the further need of defining the risk, or risks, either narrowly, or more broadly, 
as seems appropriate and just in the special type of case.”). “The linking of doing to suffering 
requires describing the risk at a level of generality appropriate both to what the defendant did 
and what the plaintiff suffered.” Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law 23 VAL. U.L. 
REV. 485, 521 (1989). Pursuant to “the multiple description problem . . . [o]ne can describe 
any harm particularly enough to say of it (under that description) that it was unforeseeable or 
generally enough to say of it (under the second description) that it was foreseeable.” MOORE, 
supra note 56, at 364-65 (citing Clarence Morris, Duty, Negligence and Causation, 101 U. PA. 
L. REV. 189 (1952)). Feinberg “speak[s] of ‘relativity to the description of the act.’ Described 
as ‘signing that legal document,’ the act was involuntary. Described as ‘exercising the limited 
choice permitted by the gunman,’ the act was voluntary.” FEINBERG, supra note 183, at 123. 
We may distinguish “a thin act-description” from “a thick one. Actually they are ‘thick’ and 
‘thin’ only relative to one another, since there is a kind of breadth spectrum permitting a 
whole range of act descriptions, some thicker than others.” Id. at 129. See John Oberdiek, 
Towards a Right Against Risking, 28 LAW & PHIL. 367, 384-87 (2009) (“reference class”).  
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lawsuit, the accepted specificity of the risk in issue is often outcome determinative. 
This gambit also affects moral judgments of imposed risks.  
Instead of the “risk” that the rescuee will be saved by the hurled lifebuoy, we 
normally think of this likelihood as a chance, prospect, or possibility without 
negative connotations.190 For this Article’s purposes, the relevant meaning of “risk” 
is narrower than simply the uncertainty or chance of a result or happening. The idea 
of injury, damage, or loss is crucial. Is, then, the creation of a risk of loss in itself a 
harm? Courts and commentators espouse various views. Some declare that creating a 
risk is in itself a harm,191 while others hold that it is not.192 Some suggest that 
                                                            
 190  Finkelstein “argue[s] that a chance of benefit is itself a benefit.” Finkelstein, supra note 
186, at 966.  
 191  “[C]reating a risk [of harm] is itself a kind of harm . . . . [I]t harms me when you drive 
carelessly in my street even if you miss me.” DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 306. “[E]ven if we 
attend only to harmful conduct, the Harm Principle must permit the criminalization of conduct 
that either causes or creates a risk of harm.” R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME 125 (2007) 
(citing FEINBERG, supra note 18, at 11 (“conduct that causes serious primary harm, or the 
unreasonable risk of such harm”)). “[I]mposition of risk and imposition of harm are not 
distinct forms of conduct. They are identical conduct viewed from an ex ante and ex post 
perspective, respectively.” Barbara H. Fried, The Limits of a Nonconsequentialist Approach to 
Torts, 18 LEGAL THEORY 231, 239 (2012). Fried points out that the law often protects against 
ex ante risk alone and identifies “a number of curious implications” of the rejection of such 
protection. See id. at 242-44. She discusses various “possibilities . . . floated for explaining the 
wrong of risk in deontological terms.” Id. at 244-48 (“Harm includes expected harm,” “[r]isk-
creation is a completed harm,” and “[r]isk-creation violates a different right from the right to 
be free from harm”). “If a person X imposes an unreasonable risk on a person Y, then, even if 
the risk does not eventuate in any tangible damage, Y has suffered a genuine loss (albeit a loss 
that is perhaps not practicably compensable).” Matthew Kramer, Of Aristotle and Ice Cream 
Cones: Reflections on Jules Coleman’s Theory of Corrective Justice, in ANALYZING LAW, 
supra note 93, at 163, 166. Kramer finds support from Coleman. “We can treat a reduction in 
security as a loss, and in the event it results from another’s wrong, it can be a wrongful loss.” 
Id. (quoting Jules Coleman, Property, Wrongfulness and the Duty to Compensate, 63 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 451, 465 (1987)). Finkelstein argues that “the imposition of a risk [is] a harm to 
the person on whom it is inflicted.” Finkelstein, supra note 186, at 965 (emphasis omitted). “I 
claim that risk harm is a form of harm that is independent of outcome harm, on the grounds 
that minimizing one’s risk exposure is an element of an agent’s basic welfare.” Id. at 966. But 
Finkelstein is cautious about pushing the risk of harm from dangerous conduct too far. 
“[F]irst, this would be only a ‘secondary’ harm, the harmful character of which derives from 
that of the primary harm which is risked.” DUFF, supra, at 125. Still, might not this secondary 
harm still be justifiably proscribed? Secondly, Finkelstein observes, some criminalized 
dangerous conduct does not “actually expose[] others to a risk of harm: someone who drives 
recklessly round a blind corner is guilty of dangerous driving even if the road is in fact clear 
and no one is actually exposed to a risk.” Id. Yet these “harmless” occurrent risks may also 
produce harms from the risk of future wrongful risks. Such a reckless driver may be more 
likely to drive recklessly when someone is exposed to the risk. Knowing this, a cautious 
driver’s conduct may be negatively affected by defensive tactics. See Kimberly K. Ferzan, 
Plotting Premeditation’s Demise, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 102 (2012) (“actions at one 
time that create a risk of a later harm are culpable at the time the risk is first created”). For 
citations to other commentators who see a (substantial) risk of harm as a harm in itself, see 
Bailey Kuklin, Punishment: The Civil Perspective of Punitive Damages, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
1, 32 n.94 (1989) (Nozick, Fishkin, Gross, Thomson). 
  Perry endorses Epstein’s equating the imposition of a known risk of harm to intentional 
harm. “[T]he imposition of a known risk, or at least of a known, substantial risk, to someone 
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creating a risk is, at some point, in itself a wrongful harm,193 while others see it to the 
contrary.194 “In summary, the problem of appraising risks from a moral point of view 
does not seem to have any satisfactory solution in established moral theories.”195  
                                                            
else’s person or property seems to be akin to the ‘taking’ which Epstein says is involved in 
intentionally causing harm to another for the purpose of furthering one’s own ends.” Perry, 
Impossibility, supra note 93, at 149.  
 192  Hurd asks, “Why is it that corrective justice theorists have unanimously eschewed the 
imposition of liability for risk-taking alone?” Heidi M. Hurd, Correcting Injustice to 
Corrective Justice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 81 (1991). For her answers, the key one being 
“no harm, no foul”, see id. at 81-84. Under corrective justice, “[c]oherence requires that the 
injustice relate act to injury and vice versa . . . . As negligence law recognizes, the injustice 
does not consist merely in the unreasonably created risk considered in itself; that would one-
sidedly focus on the defendant’s wrongful action and entail liability for unreasonable risk-
creation even without damage.” WEINRIB, supra note 83, at 3. “Those who are exposed to 
unrealized risks have no grounds for complaint [even when the risks are wrongful], for their 
rights to security are intact.” Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective Justice in 
an Age of Mass Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 27, at 214, 224. 
“Stated simply, it is either implausible or inaccurate to define ‘harm’ such that a person can be 
harmed without knowing about it and without any identifiable setback to the person’s 
interests.” Michael T. Cahill, Attempt by Omission, 94 IA. L. REV. 1207, 1218 (2009). See, 
e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 60, at 165 (“The threat of future harm, not yet realized, is 
not enough.”); Fried, supra note 191, at 240-41 (objecting while providing further citations); 
Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents, 74 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 193, 208 (2000); Stephen Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 27, at 321, 330-39 (“Is Risk a Harm 
in Itself?”). To the contrary, I argue that such a risk may produce damage, a loss, a restriction 
of one’s autonomous choices, that is, a harm. Even when ignorant of the risk, it may produce 
at least a dignitary harm, which does not require knowledge by the invadee. Adler suggests the 
question of whether risk is a harm my turn on whether one adopts a Bayesian or frequentist 
account of risk. See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of 
Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1298-302 (2003).  
 193  Under the Model Penal Code, “A person commits a misdemeanor if he recklessly 
engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious 
bodily injury.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1962) (Recklessly Endangering Another Person). 
Schroeder challenges the “feature” of tort law that requires caused harm by contending that, 
under corrective justice, one should be liable for “increas[ing] the risk of harm occurring, 
whether or not it eventually does.” Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability 
for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 439 (1990). In responding to criticism of his 
thesis, Schroeder asks, “is the risk of harm itself a harm? The answer may be yes, but less 
obviously than in the case of physical injury.” Id. at 160 (footnote omitted). Cf. Ferzan, supra 
note 191, at 102 (“actions at one time that create a risk of a later harm are culpable at the time 
the risk is first created”).  
 194  See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 262-65 
(1996). Morse rejects Hurd’s argument “that it is viciously circular and deontologically 
unacceptable to construe creating risks as wrongs . . . .” Stephen J. Morse, Reasons, Results, 
and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 394 (citing Hurd, supra, at 264-65). 
“Harms and wrongs are distinct. Moreover, I see no reason why it is deontologically 
unacceptable to consider violations of duties to others as wrongs, even in the absence of 
resulting harms. What could be more obviously wrong in itself than intentionally breaching a 
moral duty owed to others?” Id. I would put Morse’s argument this way. Whether or not 
creating a risk is seen as a harm in itself, when the conduct violates a deontic maxim, it 
produces a wrongful harm – a dignitary harm if nothing else. Hence, all deontic duty 
violations entail harms, indeed, wrongful harms.  
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Since harm is either physical, economic, psychic, or dignitary, the inquiry 
resolves to whether a risk of harm in itself is one of these four types.196 A 
hypothetical might help. Imagine an agent is target shooting on her large, isolated 
ranch without any reason to believe that another person is put at risk by this activity. 
Unknown to her, a person is within range of her bullets because he landed on her 
property due to the vagaries of his hot-air ballooning. Assume the person at risk is 
also totally unaware of the shooting risk to him. Without being hit or made aware, 
does he suffer one of the four types of harms?197 Because there is no knowledge of 
the risk by either party, there certainly are no physical or psychic harms at the time. 
Nor is there a dignitary harm. The shooter is not disrespecting the party 
unknowingly, unforeseeably put at risk. Perhaps there is an economic harm of some 
type. If aware of the (substantial) risk, the balloonist would have taken safety 
measures, including the willingness to pay the agent to stop shooting. This seems to 
stretch the everyday understanding of what constitutes an economic harm. There are 
no out-of-pocket losses or even standard lost opportunities.198 The ignorance of the 
risk precludes the opportunity of the person to take safety measures, but it is the 
ignorance of the risk that generates this lost opportunity, not the risk itself. Ignorance 
of any beneficial trade, such as a better deal on a hot-air balloon purchase, causes 
this kind of lost chance, but we do not normally think of these losses in terms of 
protected economic harms. These losses, rather, are missed economic benefits, like 
the failure to invest in a growth stock because one neglects available information or 
is risk averse. Unless we subscribe to an expansive notion of economic harm, which 
                                                            
 195  Hansson, supra note 186, at 13. Goldberg and Zipursky distinguish “the pure-conduct 
conception of wrongs,” in which risky conduct may be a wrong in itself, from “the injury-
inclusive conception of wrongs,” in which the conduct alone is insufficient. John C.P. 
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 934-35 (2010) 
(emphasis omitted). “Overwhelmingly, modern tort theorists have assumed or insisted that the 
idea of an injury-inclusive wrong is incoherent.” Id. (footnote omitted).  
 196  “On my view, the value of autonomy is related to risk in that being subject to risk can 
narrow one’s acceptable options by narrowing one’s safe options, and this constitutes a 
diminution of autonomy.” Oberdiek, supra note 189, at 373. I would identify this as a 
dignitary harm, at least.  
 197  Oberdiek discusses a hypothetical in which the shooter is aware of the risk, but the 
person at risk (you) is not. “It is . . . a diminution of your autonomy even though you were 
unaware that you were targeted. The acceptability of options, and thus their normative 
availability, depends not upon one’s belief that exercising them would be safe, but upon the 
fact that the option, if exercised, would be safe.” Id. at 374. Under this reasoning, any fact 
relevant to an agent’s choice, known to her or not, affects her autonomy, whether or not the 
creator of that fact is aware of the impact. Cf. Alan Wertheimer, Victimless Crimes, 87 ETHICS 
302, 308 (1977) (“One can surely be victimized without feeling victimized, as when one 
unknowingly consumes a harmful product or is unknowingly victimized by corporate 
conspiracies to raise prices.”).  
 198  “Cost to the economist is ‘opportunity cost’ – the benefit forgone by employing a 
resource in a way that denies its use to someone else.” RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 6 (2d ed. 1977). Moore refers to “the well-charted human tendency to 
regard out of pocket costs as more serious than opportunity costs of equal value. Economists 
have long charted such ‘framing effects’ in popular psychology . . . .” MICHAEL S. MOORE, 
CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 456 (2009).  
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may be tenable, when we look at this harm more traditionally, the creation of a risk 
of this harm need not be a harm itself.  
Perhaps we should look, instead, at the harms that would occur if the risk from 
the bullets materializes, including reactions to any misses once the person at risk 
becomes aware. These events might produce a variety of harms. We could then 
discount the expected harms from each possibility by the likelihood of its occurrence 
and combine the assortment of discounted possibilities. This prices the overall risk, 
in a sense putting it in terms of an economic harm. Existing law uses this approach 
for such things as setting damages for wrongful exposure to toxic substances, when 
physical or other likely harms have not yet ripened.199  
To stand back, in the context of risk, we generally think of a harm as something 
that a risk produces. If the risk did not, or has not yet, come to fruition, we speculate 
as to the harms that would have been produced if it had, or will be produced if it 
does. Then we discount the value of the possible harms by the magnitude of the risk. 
As part of this calculation, we include the harms produced by the reactive responses 
to the knowledge of the risk, either by the person at risk or third parties.200 We 
should also consider the knowledge of the agent producing the risk. When the agent 
becomes aware of the potential consequences of her conduct, to continue it may 
cause a dignitary harm. The agent is diminishing the practical choice options of a 
knowledgeable party at risk, thereby curtailing that person’s autonomy.201 
Depending on the circumstances, by knowingly imposing the risk the agent chooses 
to use the party at risk as a means only. At some point, then, the risk may reach a 
magnitude where we declare it a wrongful dignitary harm, irrespective of the 
absence of other types of harms.202 Again, knowledge of the risk by someone, either 
the central two parties or third party observers, is crucial. Absent knowledge of the 
risk, is the creation of the risk a harm in itself? Some commentators answer yes,203 
                                                            
 199  See generally DOBBS, supra note 100, at 434-41 (lost chance rule and increased risk 
rules).  
 200  Ripstein notes that exposure to unrealized risks generates disadvantages. “Sometimes 
risks create reasonable fears; sometime they lead others to treat me differently. Sometimes 
serious risks of serious harms will cause fear; in such circumstances, the creator of the risk 
may be held liable, but is liable not for the risk but for fear.” RIPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 76.  
 201  See supra notes 196, 197.  
 202  That an agent’s knowledge that she is violating another person’s rights may give rise to 
a dignitary harm is lost sight of by Gardner and Shute who contend that a rape is harmless 
when the victim is unaware of the rape and suffers no physical or psychic harm from it. See 
John Gardner & Stephen Shute, The Wrongfulness of Rape, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE 193, 195-99 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000).  
 203  “The passengers flying in a defective plane have been harmed by the increased risk of 
death or bodily injury they suffered, and that remains the case whether or not they knew they 
had been exposed to it.” Finkelstein, supra note 186, at 971. “If a harm is a setback to a 
legitimate interest, it should not be difficult to see why a risk of harm is itself a harm, for it is 
not difficult to make the case that exposure to risk is a setback to a legitimate interest.” Id. at 
972. For others who agree, see supra note 202; Fried, supra note 191, at 245-46 (“The victim 
of an attempted murder need not know the attempt has been made for us to conclude that the 
attempt was wrongful.”).  
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while others suggest not.204 If knowledge of a risk is required for it to be considered 
a harm, how much knowledge is needed? Suppose we tell a person that during the 
course of her life she will be unknowingly put at (substantial) risk by another’s 
conduct. “Would you now be willing to pay something to avoid this risk?” “Yes, the 
greater the risk, the more I would pay!” Is this response to the diffuse knowledge 
enough for the risk to be considered a harm? A wrongful harm?  Again, the answers 
to these questions by thoughtful, reasonable people may differ. 
When known to the person put at risk, a particular risk may produce psychic or 
dignitary harms, and even physical or economic harms, depending on that person’s 
response. This may be the case despite the actual ignorance by the agent that she 
produced the risk and whether or not the risk ripens. Furthermore, a risk may 
produce substantial harms to a person who is put at risk who is never made aware of 
it, as where third parties see the conduct creating the risk and perceive it as 
disrespectful or a threat to themselves.205  
Fortunately for my endeavor, these difficult issues need not be resolved in the 
abstract. Whether a particular risk is itself a harm, or whether knowledge of the risk 
by the actor, the person at risk, or third parties is enough to make it a harm itself, 
need not be answered in a vacuum when deciding what risk maxims to adopt. As 
long as the maxims meet the categorical imperative, the maxims declare whether a 
risk produces wrongful harms and what the requitals for the harms will be.206 
Certainly at some point it is reasonable to declare the harms wrongful. This section 
explores a few plausible maxims for drawing these lines. Before this exploration, I 
first categorize risks according to their temporal relationship to possible harms. Past, 
present (occurrent), and future risks sometimes produce different types of harms or 
produce them in different ways. 
a. Past, Present (Occurrent), and Future Risks 
Before exploring plausible maxims addressing risky conduct, I first categorize 
risks according to their temporal relationship to possible harms. Past, present 
(occurrent), and future risks sometimes produce different types of harms or produce 
them in different ways. 
Occurrent risk refers to the harms that occur when a risk is first manifested but 
before it is known whether the risk will materialize.  Examples include assault as a 
precursor of battery,207 negligent driving, and a criminal attempt at a targeted person. 
Included are some of the risks of harms from violations of truth telling, promise 
keeping, reliance, expectation, exploitation, and other maxims before they eventuate. 
                                                            
 204  In the “‘fear of cancer’ cases . . . damages are for psychiatric effects stemming from the 
knowledge of potential disease, and not for the exposure to risk itself.” JENNY STEELE, RISKS 
AND LEGAL THEORY 117 (2004). “[E]xamples [of “risk harm”], such as exposure to a risk of 
developing cancer, make sense only if the victim both perceives the risk and feels a 
psychological setback.” Sheila B. Scheuerman, Against Liability for Private Risk-Exposure, 
35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 681, 724 (2012) (citation omitted).  
 205  For example, third parties may shun a person who is unaware that she was put at risk of 
a contagious disease. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.  
 206  I may be too quick in trying to finesse these problems. For more on one of them, see 
infra text accompanying notes 216-217.  
 207  Blackstone refers to assault as “inchoate violence.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 95, at 120.  
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For instance, while dignitary and psychic harms, among others, may result from a 
statement alone by a promisor that she will not give promised aid to the promisee if 
needed (e.g., bodyguard, insurer), further harms might turn on whether the 
underlying risk materializes. Generally, as for assault, a person must be aware of an 
occurrent risk to suffer a cognizable harm under existing law.208 If she is not aware 
of the occurrent risk, she will not suffer immediate physical, economic, or psychic 
harms. She may, however, still suffer a defamatory, dignitary harm if others are 
aware of it where, for instance, observers see an agent disrespectfully throw a shoe at 
a person. If a party put at risk does not learn of it until after the risk has dissipated, 
requital for harms from past or future risk may still obtain. If she never learns of it, 
the harm, if any, is exclusively to, or a consequence of, third parties reactions when 
they become aware of the risk imposition.  
Occurrent risk may cause psychic harm (e.g., fright), and dignitary harm (e.g., 
insult, defamation). It may also cause physical and economic harms, as where a 
person reacts to a perceived risk by dropping or running into something.209 The 
protected interest is purely dignitary when requital for an occurrent risk holds in the 
absence of other harms (e.g., assault).210 Although it seems unlikely that insult would 
be among the immediate conscious reactions when one sees a tossed object flying 
toward her, nevertheless, the act may be defamatory or otherwise disrespectful. The 
psychic harm from feelings of insult is more likely to fall within the harms of a 
contemplated past or future risk. 
If an occurrent risk does not materialize, it is normally not legally requitable 
under existing private law (e.g., tort relief for negligent driving itself). A purely 
deontic legal system would, it seems to me, be open to such proscribing maxims. 
Among the concerns that give the legal community and deontologists caution about 
such maxims are evidentiary, floodgates, slippery-slope, and nuisance-suit problems. 
In American and common-law systems, the requital for occurrent risks sometimes 
falls within, is subsumed by, protections for past risks that have materialized and 
future risks.211 Once negligent driving causes an accident, the invadee can recover 
                                                            
 208  See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 100, at 63; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 60, at 44.  
 209  See, e.g., Tuttle v. Atlantic City R.R., 49 A. 450, 451 (N.J. 1901) (allowing recovery 
when the plaintiff, “[a]cting under the impulse of fear,” injured herself while fleeing from a 
risk that would not have materialized).  
 210  Prosser refers to assault as causing a “mental” injury or invasion. PROSSER & KEETON, 
supra note 60, at 43. This is consistent with the requirement that the invadee be aware of, “in 
apprehension of”, the threat as it occurs. See id. at 43-44. But it is not consistent with the 
standard rule that the invadee need not be in fear. See id. at 44. When there is no such psychic 
harm, as I would label it, or other standard harm, then it appears the harm being protected is 
dignitary only. See generally DOBBS, supra note 100, at 63-65.  
 211  In justifying her view that an unrealized risk is a harm in itself, Finkelstein addresses 
troublesome issues, such as whether a person can recover for a risk prior to materialization as 
well as for the additional harm if it does materialize. To avoid this “double counting” she 
advances the “Absorption Thesis”: “Outcome harm and benefit, in short, result in antecedent 
risks or chances being absorbed into the resulting harms and benefits.” Finkelstein, supra note 
186, at 993. Similarly, “[i]t is assumed that [an] incomplete attempt merges with the crime or 
the completed attempt.” Larry Alexander & Kimberly K. Ferzan, Risk and Inchoate Crimes: 
Retribution or Prevention?, in SEEKING SECURITY: PRE-EMPTING THE COMMISSION OF 
CRIMINAL HARMS 103, 117 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 2012) (questioning this 
assumption).  
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for harms from the past risk (e.g., painful psychic reactions, damages to person and 
property) and, possibly, future risks (e.g., ongoing fright from the accident 
preventing the invadee from further driving, physical disabilities that increase 
various future risks).212  
With respect to past risk, once the immediate risk is over, whether or not it 
materialized, harms may still occur from retrospection.213 These harms may be of all 
types: physical (e.g., reactive illness); economic (e.g., work missed from trauma); 
psychic (e.g., fright from “near misses”); and, dignitary (e.g., insult and defamation 
once the invadee and others learn of a purposive, past risk).  
Turning to future risk, after an immediate risk has passed, harms may occur from 
prospection.214 Again, these harms may be of all types: physical (e.g., illness from 
insecurity); economic (e.g., expenditures for protections); psychic (e.g., increased 
feelings of insecurity); and, dignitary (e.g., perception that invader is disrespectful 
and her insulting, defamatory conduct may recur).  
Once an agent imposes a risk on another person, it may be more likely that the 
agent will further impose another such risk.215 Punishment for recidivism takes this 
into account. The future risk may be to the party who had been put at immediate risk, 
other identifiable parties, the general public, or some combination. Even a past risk 
to no one or to the agent alone, as where she drives recklessly on her own property 
without any other person around, may signal a comparable, increased future risk to 
others.216 As an empirical matter she may be more likely to drive recklessly in a less 
isolated environment.  
b. Maxims Addressing Risky Conduct  
Let us look at some plausible maxims regarding risk imposition, starting with the 
most general: “Do not impose a risk on others.” This maxim is too broad.217 It 
creates a realm of strict, even absolute liability. Agents are not granted sufficient 
scope to exercise their liberty by choosing conduct based on adequate information 
                                                            
 212  See DOBBS, supra note 100, at 1047-53. 
 213  Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for Future Harm 221, 233, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
CAUSATION (Richard Goldberg ed., 2011). 
 214  See id. at 226. 
 215  “‘[C]riminal law’ deals with what we might call the right of extended self defense . . . . 
[C]riminal law involves using force to respond to threats of future rights violations . . . .” 
RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY 190 (1998); see Randy E. Barnett, Getting 
Even: Restitution, Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 157, 
160, 165 (1996); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying 
Liberty Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible, 96 MINN. L. REV. 141, 146 (2011).  
 216  Would not a parent whose children played along the boundary road with this reckless 
neighbor, instruct the kids to stay well away from the road even though the neighbor’s risks 
from driving had not yet come to fruition? Ripstein seems to analyze this scenario differently; 
“By imposing a risk on you, I endanger what is yours, but I do not deprive you of it. You are 
still as free as ever to use what is yours to set and pursue your own purposes.” Ripstein, supra 
note 35, at 77. Zipursky agrees with Ripstein. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
Perhaps I misunderstand this point. No parent would say: “Sure, kids, you can play along the 
neighbor’s road. If worse comes to worst, we can get full compensation.”  
 217  Applicable requital maxims could limit the reach of this substantive maxim.  
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about potential normative consequences and freedom from coercive forces. 
Therefore, an abridging agent may not have been responsibility blameworthy. Nor 
may she be disrespect blameworthy regarding the party at risk. To the contrary, such 
extensive strict liability would be, it seems, disrespectful of the agent. This balance 
between liberty and security overvalues security.218 Whether or not the risk 
materializes, the maxim smacks of absolute outcome responsibility.  
“Do not [intentionally, purposively] impose an unreasonable [foreseeable] risk 
on others.”219 Contrary to what might be entailed by an unreasonable risk, the 
imposition of a reasonable risk on another person does not use her as a means only. 
It is not disrespectful. Under reasonable risk maxims the other person is entitled to 
impose a comparable risk back on the imposer. The liberty-security balance is 
reciprocal. It reflects equal respect. It is fair.220 
The concept of “reasonable” is fundamental to these maxims. There are many 
conceptions of this key term. Under the individualized view taken here, one person’s 
“reasonable” may be another person’s “unreasonable.”221 People may, for one, have 
differing risk dispositions, one being risk-preferring and the other risk-averse.  
                                                            
 218  “[T]he cost of avoiding all behavior that involves risk of harm would be unacceptable. 
Our idea of ‘reasonable precautions’ defines the level of care that we think can be demanded: 
a principle that demanded more than this would be too confining, and could reasonably be 
rejected on that ground.” SCANLON, supra note 143, at 209. “Risk impositions thus pit the 
liberty of injurers against the security of victims and the law of accidents sets the terms on 
which these competing freedoms are reconciled. Its task is to find and fix terms that are fair.” 
Keating, supra note 31, at 23. “The view is Kantian because of the way that it articulates these 
ideas of freedom and fairness.” Id.  
 219  Alexander argues that “the core criminal injunctions will be of the type ‘do not create 
an unjustifiable risk of harm X,’ where X designates the type of interest protected.” Larry 
Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 28 (1994). “The negligence 
standard entails dividing the possible consequences of the defendant’s acts into those that are 
the materialization of a substantial risk and those that are not.” Weinrib, supra note 189, at 
520.  
 220  “Issues of interpersonal risk imposition are fundamentally matters of fairness, not 
matters of efficiency . . . . [I]t is fair when so doing is to the long run expected advantage of 
the person imperiled.” Keating, supra note 31, at 30.  
 221  Existing law, as legal economists emphasize, concretizes “reasonable” conduct 
satisfying the negligence standard by the Hand formula. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 371 (1990). The formula comes from United States v. Carroll 
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). In Moore’s words, “[o]ne must . . . ‘balance the 
evils’ to decide whether an act is negligent or reckless.” MOORE, supra note 56, at 676. The 
Hand formula is interpreted as relying upon Kaldor-Hicks efficiency whereby risk must be 
justified by a cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., KLAUS MATHIS, EFFICIENCY INSTEAD OF JUSTICE? 
153 (Deborah Shannon trans., 2009). Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is outside the high walls of 
Kant’s realm. It allows individuals to be used as a means for overall social welfare advances. 
Still outside the walls, but closer, is Pareto superiority, under which trades are allowable so 
long as at least one person is made better off and no one is made worse off. See, e.g., Lewis 
Kornhauser, The Economic Analysis of Law § 5.2 (“The Pareto Criterion”), STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-econanalysis/ (last 
visited May 8, 2016). “Pareto efficiency is completely unconcerned with distribution of 
utilities (or of incomes or anything else), and is quite uninterested in equity.” AMARTYA SEN, 
RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 504 (2002). “The test [of the Hand formula] . . . pivots not on the 
equality of the parties to the transaction but on the surplus that one party realizes at the 
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A version of the maxim, “do not impose foreseeable, unreasonable risks on 
others,” is commonly adopted by existing law, but with a major qualification often 
added: the risk must materialize for the harm to be legally injurious. As mentioned 
before, for some risks, such as tortious or criminal assault and criminal attempts, the 
risk, or known risk, alone is remediable,222 but for other risks, including negligence, 
the risk must eventuate for the imposee to obtain a requital. Legal damages are an 
element of the legal claim.223 These typically exclude psychic and dignitary harms 
standing alone. When a risk alone is protected, and it materializes, as where an 
assault leads to a battery, there may be two, or more, violated maxims.224  
Under existing law, whether an unreasonable risk produces a wrongful harm, 
either in the private or the public, criminal, sphere, is complicated. In tort law, an 
issue is whether the imposition of an unreasonable risk that eventuates must be to a 
                                                            
expense of others.” WEINRIB, supra note 27, at 48. For objections to Weinrib’s point, see 
Kenneth W. Simons, Justification in Private Law, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 698, 704-05 (1996) 
(book review). “The problem is that in the Learned Hand Formula, the degree of security to 
which the victim is entitled is entirely a function of the degree to which the potential injurer 
values his liberty . . . . [Therefore this standard is] in violation of the criterion of fairness, and, 
thus, corrective justice.” Jules Coleman, Tort Law and Tort Theory: Preliminary Reflections 
on Method, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 27, at 183, 206 (footnote 
omitted). “The Learned Hand Test is inappropriate to the practice of tort law because it runs 
afoul of the principle that best explains tort law – namely, the principle of corrective justice.” 
Id. “The Hand test misses out on important structural features of negligence liability; 
moreover, it does so because it is at odds with the core idea that one party may not set the 
terms of interaction unilaterally.” Ripstein, Philosophy, supra note 97, at 679. Zipursky also 
objects that the Hand formula “do[es] not capture the meaning of ‘negligence’ or ‘ordinary 
care’ in our negligence law.” Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, supra note 111, at 1256. See 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 1999-2002 (2007). To 
raise another problem with the Hand formula, under its economic interpretation, it gives equal 
weight to the probability of the risk and the loss that would ensue if the risk materializes. A 
deontic conception of reasonable risk might not do this. The degree of the autonomy space 
reduction from a risk may be weightier than its probability, or vice versa. For example, a ten 
percent risk of death may be more than twice as invasive as a five percent risk. A ten percent 
risk of losing all of one’s resources may be more than twice as invasive as a ten percent risk of 
losing half of one’s resources. As for invasiveness, along with marginal effects, other 
weighting factors may include whether the harm is to hypothetical, formal, or material 
autonomy space. See Kuklin, supra note 1, at 408-14.  
 222  In cases for which the risk alone is said to be remediable, arguably the risk has come to 
fruition, either from the knowledge of the imposee (tortious assault) or the reactive responses 
and increased future risk to the public (criminal assault). “If, without intending harm, I act in a 
way that I realize might injure you or damage your property, I endanger your physical security 
or property . . . . The criminal law protects these interests against such endangerment.” DUFF, 
supra note 191, at 148 (noting that “English and American law have no general offence of 
unconsummated endangerment analogous to the law of attempts.”). Contrary to my view, Duff 
does not see endangerments necessarily as harms. “If the risk is not actualized, I merely 
endanger him; if it is actualized, I endanger him and harm him.” Id. at 151.  
 223  “In principle, the division between wrongs actionable per se and those only actionable 
upon proof of consequential loss should reflect a choice between those rights which are, and 
are not, as a question of social fact sufficiently important to be deserving of protection 
irrespective of the consequences of violation.” STEVENS, supra note 41, at 89.  
 224  But, for fear of double counting, there may only be one remedy. See supra note 209.  
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person foreseeable at the time of the conduct, or whether an unreasonable risk to the 
world at large, once it materializes, will suffice.225 Some risks of harm to particular 
or random, unidentifiable individuals, impose immediate risks to the general public 
(e.g., negligent driving, reckless endangerment). These risks may warrant 
independent claims by the public in the form of criminal prohibitions whether or not 
the risks come to pass.226 Criminal proscriptions can be distinguished from civil 
proscriptions by holding an agent responsible for wrongful risks of harm to 
unforeseeable persons in the criminal context only.  
“Do not impose [foreseeable] nonreciprocal risks on others.” While 
“nonreciprocal” risks could fall within the ambit of “unreasonable” risks, I separate 
out these plausible maxims because of the prominence of the idea of nonreciprocal 
risks in the legal literature.227 George Fletcher was the first to advance this 
principle.228 The standard of nonreciprocal risks resonates in various areas of the 
law, as in the doctrine of “live and let live,”229 and the interpretation of Rylands v. 
Fletcher whereby strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities does not apply to 
customary land uses.230 It also suggests the Golden Rule, though Kant balks at 
                                                            
 225  See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).  
 226  For the Model Penal Code section on reckless endangerment, see supra note 193.  
 227  “Fairness ideas – social contract ideas – in tort theory have long been associated with 
the idea and criterion of reciprocity of risk.” Keating, supra note 192, at 202 (footnote 
omitted); see id. at 202-04.  
 228  “The general principle . . . [found in tort] doctrinal standards is that a victim has a right 
to recover for injuries caused by a risk greater in degree and different in order from those 
created by the victim and imposed on the defendant – in short, for injuries resulting from 
nonreciprocal risks.” Fletcher, supra note 105, at 542. “[T]he effect of contributory negligence 
is to render the risks again reciprocal, and the defendant’s risk-taking does not subject the 
victim to a relative deprivation of security.” Id. at 549 (footnote omitted). Fletcher analogizes 
his “paradigm of reciprocity” to Rawls’s “first principle of justice . . . : we all have the right to 
the maximum amount of security compatible with a like security for everyone else.” Id. at 550 
(footnote omitted). Moore sees Fletcher’s analysis as an example of where corrective justice 
requites the injustice “when one party is unjustly enriched by his own behaviour vis-à-vis 
another, which unjust enrichment may take the form . . . of the less tangible benefit of 
asymmetrical risk imposition.” MOORE, supra note 56, at 6 (footnoting Fletcher).  
  Even in his seminar article, Fletcher recognizes there are difficulties with his principle 
of nonreciprocity. For example, see Fletcher, supra note 105, at 549, 570-72. The principle 
has drawn a great deal of attention from commentators, much of it critical. See, e.g., JOHN C.P. 
GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORTS 262 (2010); Coleman, Legal Theory, supra note 
93, at 2612-13, 2616-17; Englard, supra note 93, at 66; Adam Slavny, Nonreciprocity and the 
Moral Basis of Liability to Compensate, 34 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 417 (2014). See generally 
Keating, supra note 31; Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, supra note 27.  
 229  See supra note 93 and accompanying text. “[T]he reciprocity of mutual imposition and 
tolerance – the idea that one should ‘give and take, live and let live’ – preserves the equality of 
the interacting property owners.” WEINRIB, supra note 27, at 194 (citation omitted).  
 230  Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (Cairns, L.C.); see PROSSER & KEETON, 
supra note 60, at 545-46; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(e) (1977) (considering as a 
factor for abnormally dangerous activities the “inappropriateness of the activity to the place 
where it is carried on”).  
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interpreting the categorical imperative in this way.231 A maxim that allows the 
imposition of reciprocal risks seems to get through the filter of the categorical 
imperative. An agent is not using another as a means only, is not disrespectful, when 
imposing a risk on another person that is no greater than the comparable risk the 
other person may impose on the agent. This could even apply to great risks mutually 
imposed.232 Reciprocal risks, especially when they are reasonable, strike a fair 
balance between liberty and security interests.233  
6. Miscellaneous Substantive Maxims 
Before looking at the broadest category of substantive maxims—norms—I 
briefly mention a few other types of plausible maxims to show the breadth of 
concerns that can fit within the big tent of the categorical imperative. They have 
generally fallen outside common law doctrines. This survey is very far from 
exhaustive. 
“Do not disrespectfully discriminate because of a person’s innate 
characteristics.”234 For purposes of respecting a person’s equal dignity, this would 
disallow discrimination on grounds of such traits as race, religion, caste, ethnicity, 
                                                            
 231  While some forms of the categorical imperative, and other arguments by Kant, are 
suggestive of the Golden Rule, Kant specifically distinguished them and found the Golden 
Rule wanting. See KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 37, at 80 n.*. Under Kant, “[w]hat is 
wrong with the Golden Rule (in both its positive and negative versions) is that as stated it 
allows our natural inclinations and the special circumstances to play an improper role in our 
deliberations.” JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 199 (Barbara 
Herman ed., 2000). Parfit thinks that Kant was wrong to be so dismissive of the Golden Rule. 
See 1 PARFIT, supra note 129, at 321-30.  
 232  Hanging over the permissibility of imposing great risks is the Consent Principle. See 
supra text accompanying note 71. The consenters must know well enough what they are 
getting into.  
 233  “When reasonable risks are reciprocal, each member of the community that imposes 
and is exposed to them: (1) relinquishes an equal amount of freedom; (2) gains an equal 
amount of security; and (3) gains more in the way of freedom than they lose in the way of 
security.” Keating, supra note 31, at 31 (discussing Fletcher’s account). “Reciprocity of 
reasonable risk imposition thus defines a circumstance where risk is fairly distributed.” Id. at 
33; see also id. at 63-64.        
    Maxims that allow the imposition of reasonable or reciprocal risks may 
not satisfy all fair-minded people. An agent may ask, “why should I be held to a reasonable 
person or reciprocal risk standard when I prefer another risk maxim, or none at all?” But see 
SANDEL, supra note 2, at 146 (“Consent is not a necessary condition of moral obligation. If the 
mutual benefit is clear enough, the moral claims of reciprocity may hold even without an act 
of consent.”). I have another view of what is a reciprocal risk, I have another degree of risk 
tolerance (disposition), I prefer the social welfare consequences of another balance, I believe it 
is more virtuous to tolerate more risk than one imposes, etc.” Here as elsewhere, these 
challenges raise political questions. As Ripstein states, “A particular objective standard is 
always an expression of particular views about the importance of various interests. As a result, 
in an important sense, it is always political, and in principle subject to contest.” Ripstein, 
supra note 27, at 88. 
 234  “The other way [beyond insulting conduct] that law protects dignity is by prohibiting 
invidious discrimination.” Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights, in 29 THE TANNER 
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 207, 234 (Suzan Young ed., 2011).  
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disability, national origin, sexual orientation, and gender identification. Especially 
worrisome is discrimination owing to qualities for which the person is not 
blameworthy, is not responsible, and does not deserve. Some types of discriminatory 
conduct (e.g., racial) are particularly disrespectful because of their significance in 
light of existing or historical social practices.235 On the other hand, denying a person 
a place on a high school basketball team because she is an innate klutz need not be 
done offensively. Hence, “do not disrespectfully discriminate . . . . .” Refinement of 
this plausible maxim is necessary.  
“[Reasonably] preserve natural resources [the environment].” The justification 
for these maxims looks largely to physical, economic, and psychic harms to others, 
including future generations. The Lockean proviso is off the table.236 New frontiers 
for the disadvantaged and disaffected are no longer in sight. Many things that we are 
doing to our planet impact others. When our damage to the planet becomes 
irreparable, it may also produce dignitary harm.237 One might argue that the implicit 
claim of a right to harm the planet denies the moral equality of future persons who 
will suffer the consequences.238 For those currently living, even a claim for a 
reciprocal right may be disrespectful to those who have no realistic opportunity to 
exercise or benefit from it, as where egregious air polluters would grant everyone the 
right to so pollute.  
“Undertake [easy, reasonable, safe] rescues.” These maxims expand security 
interests. They stem from respect.239 A maxim requiring easy rescues does not, 
                                                            
 235  See SCANLON, supra note 87, at 72-74.  
 236  See LOCKE, supra note 95, at 291 (“Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of Land, 
by improving it, any prejudice to any other Man, since there was still enough, and as good 
left; and more than the yet unprovided could use.”).  
 237  For various Kantian justifications for environmentalism, see, for example, MATTHEW C. 
ALTMAN, Kant’s Strategic Importance for Environmental Ethics, in KANT AND APPLIED 
ETHICS 45 (2011); PAUL GUYER, Duties Regarding Nature, in KANT AND THE EXPERIENCE OF 
FREEDOM 304 (1996); John Martin Gillroy, Kantian Ethics and Environmental Policy 
Argument: Autonomy, Ecosystem Integrity, and Our Duties to Nature, 3 ETHICS & ENV’T 131 
(1998); Marc Lucht, Does Kant Have Anything to Teach Us About Environmental Ethics?, 66 
AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 1 (2007).  
 238  The moral claims here are quite complicated. See, e.g., RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE 
GENERATIONS: ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (Ernest Partridge ed., 1981); Edith Brown Weiss, 
Implementing Intergenerational Equity, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 100 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., 2010); Anthony D’Amato et al., 
Agora: What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global 
Environmental Responsibility, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 190 (1990); Joseph Heath, The Structure of 
Intergenerational Cooperation, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (2013); Bradford C. Mank, 
Protecting the Environment for Future Generations: A Proposal for a “Republican” 
Superagency, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 444 (1996); Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Future 
Generations: Does Massachusetts v. EPA Open Standing for Generations to Come?, 34 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2009); Joseph Mazor, Liberal Justice, Future People, and Natural 
Resource Conservation, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 380 (2010); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental 
Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
941 (1999).  
 239  “[A]s Kant well recognized, a general moral duty of mutual aid, requiring supplying a 
great need to another (for example, saving life) when at minimal cost to the agent, would be 
universalized as a moral principle of obligation and duty.” David A.J. Richards, Human Rights 
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arguably, unduly interfere with an agent’s liberty.240 When rescues entail 
nonconsensual positive duties, the common law has been reluctant to require 
them,241 unless, generally, the agent has caused, negligently or otherwise, the need 
for the rescue, or has a special relationship with the person in need.242 
“Reciprocate benefits.” With this plausible, unqualified substantive maxim, I 
may have gone too far. Unless the benefit was overtly sought, this seems to have 
taken us out of the realm of Kant’s perfect, consensual duties and into his realm of 
imperfect ones. For Kant, imperfect duties are duties of virtue.243 “Fulfillment of 
                                                            
and the Moral Foundations of the Substantive Criminal Law, 13 GA. L. REV. 1395, 1429 
(1979) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 41 (L.W. 
Beck trans., 1959)). “It is generally agreed that there is a duty of easy rescue . . . .” BARBARA 
HERMAN, MORAL LITERACY 203 (2007). As Dworkin states: 
We owe [strangers] duties of aid when that aid is crucial, when we can give it with no 
great damage to our own ambitions, and, particularly, when we are directly confronted 
by suffering or danger. In these circumstances, to refuse our aid would show a 
contempt for other people’s lives that would deny self-respect as well.  
DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 300. But, “[a] rich and secure person who expects to remain rich 
and secure may calculate that he or she may be likely to lose more by having to perform 
nearly risk-free and costless rescues of nearby strangers than he or she realistically stands to 
gain from others . . . .” R. George Wright, Treating Persons as Ends in Themselves: The Legal 
Implications of a Kantian Principle, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 271, 309 (2002). This calculation can 
be forestalled by placing maxim formulators behind Rawls’s veil of ignorance. See id. at 309-
10.  
 240  “[D]emanding easy rescues does not, in fact, interfere with a person’s pursuit of his or 
her own ends. Hence imposing such a demand via the criminal law does not actually abridge 
anyone’s freedom.” Ripstein, supra note 83, at 779. But, Ripstein continues, tort law is not up 
to the task of drawing proper lines at easy rescues: “As a result, adding such a duty to tort law 
would wreak havoc with its structural core. To do so would interfere with freedom.” Id.; see 
RIPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 92. Tort law does not have the resources to do the job properly, as 
by qualifying the duty with such limits as “easy, reasonable, or safe”? These types of 
standards thrive elsewhere in the law. Tort law and law in general, as I see it, lives on this 
kind of slippery slope. Balancing liberty and security is a continuous, difficult endeavor. So be 
it. If the structural core is the problem, let us revise the core if at all possible. The core is to 
serve justice, not limit it. “[T]here is no argument of moral principle to support the general 
failure of Anglo-American law to recognize good samaritan duties in contexts to which the 
underlying moral duty of mutual aid applies.” Richards, supra note 239, at 1429 (footnote 
omitted). 
 241  See generally DOBBS, supra note 100, at 853 (“Unless the defendant has assumed a 
duty to act, or stands in a special relationship to the plaintiff, defendants are not liable in tort 
for a pure failure to act for the plaintiff’s benefit.”); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 60, at 375 
(“the law has persistently refused to impose on a stranger the moral obligation of common 
humanity to go to the aid of another human being who is in danger”).  
 242  See DOBBS, supra note 100, at 856-69; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 60, § 56 (“Acts 
and Omissions”). “[C]ourts have rigidly adhered to the rule that in the absence of some special 
relationship between victim and bystander, sins of omission are never crimes.” LEO KATZ, 
BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 138 (1987). Most, but not all, special relationships are 
consensual. While one may only weakly consent to having children, one does not consent at 
all to one’s natural and, typically, adoptive parents. Fairness, reciprocity, and other principles 
may do the work in the absence of consent.  
 243  See KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 37, at 161. 
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them is merit . . . but failure to fulfill them is not in itself culpability . . . but rather 
mere deficiency in moral worth . . . , unless the subject should make it his principle 
not to comply with such duties.”244 If we stick with Kant on this, we must leave the 
adoption of duties to reciprocate unrequested benefits to individual consciences.  
While deontic maxims may not directly mandate the reciprocation of benefits, 
social norms often adopt standards for such reciprocity. They range over a wide 
territory. Norms distinguish among the types of benefits to be reciprocated, from 
supererogatory dangerous rescues, to gifts, opportunities, hospitality, and common 
courtesy. There may be a natural human disposition to reciprocate.245 From a deontic 
perspective, the failure to reciprocate a granted benefit is not per se a curtailment of 
the voluntary grantor’s liberty or security, nor constitute using her as a means only, 
but it may be disrespectful in other ways. Social norms frame society’s and a 
benefiter’s understanding of whether failure to reciprocate is disrespectful. The 
frame may imply, to the contrary, that actual reciprocation is sometimes 
disrespectful, as where a social or business superior gives a gift to one in a lower 
position, unless, perhaps, expressed gratitude is considered proper reciprocation. In 
this case reciprocation is satisfied by a requital maxim, of sorts, to show gratitude or 
other nonmaterial acknowledgment, but not more.  
The demand to reciprocate benefits has taken us outside the immediate realm of 
deontic maxims and into the realm of norms, both social and legal. We have spent 
much time there already, particularly when looking to the existing common and 
criminal laws. Let us take a closer look. 
7. Norms 
A norm is a standard embraced by a social group that each member is expected to 
follow.246 I use the term “norm” broadly to include mores, customs, conventions, 
                                                            
 244  KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9, at 521.  
 245  Reciprocity is a disposition “to return good in proportion to the good we receive, and to 
make reparation for the harm we have done. Moreover, reciprocity is a fundamental virtue. Its 
requirements have presumptive authority over many competing considerations.” LAWRENCE C. 
BECKER, RECIPROCITY 3 (1986). That there is a human inclination to reciprocate, and expect 
reciprocation, and other moral inclinations as well, see, e.g., Robert Kurzban, Biological 
Foundations of Reciprocity, in TRUST AND RECIPROCITY 105 (Elinor Ostrom & James Walker 
eds., 2003); Bailey Kuklin, The Natures of Universal Moralities, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 463 
(2009).  
 246  “Wherever interaction is continual, dense, and valuable to participants, distinctive 
patterns of behavior emerge. When deviations from these patterns provoke nonlegal sanctions, 
we say that the patterns are social norms. Social norms both create options and suppress 
them.” ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 203 (2000). “For norms to be social, they 
must be (a) shared by other people and (b) partly sustained by their approval and disapproval.” 
JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 99 (1989) (citation omitted). See generally ROBERT 
AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION 44-68 (1997) (“Promoting Norms”); ELSTER, 
supra, at 97-151 (“Social norms”); Symposium, Norms in Moral and Social Theory, 100 
ETHICS 725 (1990); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of 
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537 (2000).  
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usages, principles, rules,247 regulations, statutes, constitutions, etc.248 Although 
norms are coercive by putting pressure on group members to conform to their 
standards, they seem rarely so coercive as to undermine the responsibility 
blameworthiness of those who are induced to comply with them.249  
Norms may or may not be directly grounded on deontic principles. They may be 
ancient, bottom-up practices whose origins are independent of deontic reasoning, or 
any perceptible reasoning at all, or specifically based on nondeontic moral reasoning 
(e.g., utility, communitarianism).250 Many norms are, at least partially, coordination 
or cooperation rules or standards.251 A particular norm may initially be morally 
                                                            
 247  “Norms, unlike rules, can be particular as well as general. Some principles as well as 
rules are norms, but not all the types of rules and principles are norms. Technical rules, e.g., 
are not norms.” MacCormick & Raz, supra note 154, at 79.  
 248  “Sociologists and anthropologists . . . disagree about the precise definition of norms.” 
ROBERT NOZICK, INVARIANCES 238 (2001). “It is not obvious how to demarcate ethical norms 
from other norms, including enforced laws, rules of etiquette, etc.” Id. For various loose 
demarcations, see, for example, TUNICK, supra note 128, at 11; Robert Sugden, The Role of 
Inductive Reasoning in the Evolution of Conventions, 17 LAW & PHIL. 377, 382 (1998). 
Coleman, for example, holds that wrongfulness is a matter of social convention. See JULES L. 
COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 334 (1992) (“reasonable care . . . is a failure to abide by 
governing community norms”).  
 249  Ripstein bases his “reciprocity conception of responsibility” on what people “are 
entitled to expect of each other.” Arthur Ripstein, Justice and Responsibility, 17 CAN. J.L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 361, 361 (2004); see also supra note 83 and accompanying text.  
 250  See COLEMAN, supra note 41, at 34 (“On my view, much of the content of the first-
order duties that are protected in tort law is created and formed piecemeal in the course of our 
manifold social and economic interactions. These generate conventions that give rise to 
expectations among individuals regarding the kind and level of care they—we—can 
reasonably demand of one another.”) (citation omitted). “The fact that a prevailing 
understanding exists, even if there is no particularly good reason for it, makes it reasonable at 
the time it is relied upon.” TUNICK, supra note 128, at 116. Jackendoff observes that “a sense 
of morality is universal, but particular morals are not. Rather, particular moral systems are 
associated with particular social groups of various sizes.” Ray Jackendoff, The Natural Logic 
of Morals and of Laws, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 379, 388 (2002).  
 251  “A social contract is the set of common understandings that allow the citizens of a 
society to coordinate their efforts.” KEN BINMORE, NATURAL JUSTICE 3 (2011) (understandings 
including table manners, significance attached to money, driving rules, word meanings, 
taboos, fashion, amount of restaurant tips). “The use of criminal law to solve co-ordination 
problems like getting people to drive on the same side of the road can be justified on legal 
moralist grounds because the passage of the law makes salient the solution to the problem.” 
MOORE, supra note 56, at 73. For discussions of rules and law as coordination devices, see 
Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, What is Law? A Coordination Model of the 
Characteristics of Legal Order, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 471, 502-05 (2012) (identifying many 
subscribers to this view); Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 132, at 427 n.116. Green, 
however, finds that “[t]he claim that the primary or basic characteristic of law is that of a co-
ordinative agency does not withstand examination. Such an expectation-based model opens up 
what I called the ‘reality gap’ between the structure of values and the structure of 
expectations.” Leslie Green, Law, Co-ordination and the Common Good, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 299, 322 (1983). Coordination and cooperation, though run together here, are not 
identical. “‘Cooperation,’ in the sense in which it is being used here, is a technical term used 
to describe situations in which a group of individuals, by exercising restraint in their pursuit of 
 
57Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
1022 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:965 
 
neutral, as is the norm to drive on the right. But the norm may take on moral 
significance by, say, expanding the liberty and security of those who can depend on 
conformity, or by increasing social welfare from efficiency.252 Like baseline or 
default contract and tort rules, which have coordination and cooperation features, 
some norms are mutable, such as the contract default rule that consideration is 
gauged by fair market value and the tort limitations on nonconsensual touchings. 
Other norms are immutable, such as the proscription against the waiver of the good 
faith duty in contracts and the refusal to allow consensual assisted suicide.253  
If a norm is directly grounded on a deontic maxim (e.g., a criminal battery 
statute), then this norm does all the deontic work without the need to invoke a 
second, deontic meta-norm (e.g., “obey the law [norms]”,254 “respect others’ self-
regarding choices”) to bring it into the deontic sphere.255 As for a norm that is 
contrary to the categorical imperative, such as one mandating discrimination on the 
basis of religion or ethnicity, not even an acceptable meta-norm can legitimize it. 
Dashing reliance or expectations aroused by a disrespectful norm, for instance, gets 
no deontic traction. For norms not directly deontic, or deontically neutral,256 such as 
some of the ones relating to voting, wearing seatbelts and helmets, taxes,257 animal 
                                                            
individual self-interests, is able to achieve an outcome that is better for them all.” Heath, 
supra note 238, at 35 (footnoting references identifying a variety of definitions).  
 252  “Those who drive on the left do a moral wrong because they violate antecedently 
existing moral norms against risking harm to others, and such moral wrong may legitimately 
be punished.” MOORE, supra note 56, at 73.  
  Pallikkathayil observes that established social practices, though having benefits, “lack 
the impartiality needed to establish a rightful condition. There is no mechanism for 
challenging informal social norms as inconsistent with equal external freedom or for 
challenging the view another person has about the proper application of a norm in a given 
case.” Pallikkathayil, supra note 55, at 138-39 (calling for “an impartial decision-making 
procedure for settling disputes over rights”). See TUNICK, supra note 128, at 116 (“We should 
want to change [a prevailing] understanding if it is irrational, but prevailing understandings 
are the measure of reasonableness at the time agreements are made.”).  
 253  See Mark L. Movsesian, Two Cheers for Freedom of Contract, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1529 (2002) (reviewing THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed., 
1999)). 
 254  That the deontic basis for the duty to obey the law is challengeable, see supra note 56 
and accompanying text.  
 255  “[T]here might be a conventional meta-norm that deems publicly flouting moral norms 
to be disrespectful of those present, and violation of this conventional meta-norm might then 
legitimate punishment, even if violation of the underlying moral norm would not.” Alexander, 
supra note 107, at 863. Alexander cautions that such a meta-norm may go too far, such as by 
legitimizing the punishment of any conduct perceived as offensive, including private immoral 
conduct. See id. at 863-64. At this point there occurs a conflict in prima facie 
disrespectfulness: the disrespect shown to the offended observer versus the disrespect shown 
to the offending agent from disallowing her private choice.  
 256  A norm may be deontically neutral if violation of it is not disrespectful of another 
person.  
 257  For criminal instances of “tax evasion, bribery, obstruction of justice, and damage to 
public property[,] [t]he rights of private persons are not necessarily violated . . . .” Franklin G. 
Miller, Restitution and Punishment: A Reply to Barnett, 88 ETHICS 358, 359 (1978). “In 
 
58https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss4/7
2016] PRIVATE REQUITALS 1023 
 
cruelty,258 victimless crimes,259 the environment,260 and others,261 deontic meta-
norms are required to do work necessary to create deontic duties and, if relevant, 
correlative rights. The same can be said of norms relating to Kant’s imperfect duties 
of virtue, such as to be beneficent.262 They may be elevated to deontic duties with 
correlative rights, as by conduct that falls within a reliance or expectation maxim.263 
An adopted meta-norm puts an agent on alert about its possible indirect effects on 
her autonomy space boundaries resulting from incorporation of lower-level, non-
deontic norms. This allows her to make reasonable, responsible choices either by 
way of adjusting the boundaries through consent, if mutable, or exercising her liberty 
and defending her security within the established boundaries. 
                                                            
requiring a citizen to pay taxes we are not requiring her to surrender her autonomy: she will 
lose the opportunity to use that money for other purposes; but she will not be giving up her 
ability to determine her own actions.” DUFF, supra note 49, at 177. Well, taxes may preclude 
some of her choices, thus constricting her liberty in this regard. Tax laws and others that 
produce public goods will get deontic support, arguably, under the view that free riders are 
disrespectful of others. They implicitly claim moral superiority.  
 258  That Kant offers support for animal cruelty norms, see KANT, METAPHYSICS OF 
MORALS, supra note 9, at 564 (Animal cruelty “dulls [a person’s] shared feeling of their 
suffering and so weakens and gradually uproots a natural predisposition that is very 
serviceable to morality in one’s relations with other people.”); IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON 
ETHICS 239-41 (Louis Infield trans. 1930) (“Duties Towards Animals and Spirits”). See 
MATTHEW C. ALTMAN, Animal Suffering and Moral Character, in KANT AND APPLIED ETHICS, 
supra note 237, at 13; THOMAS E. HILL, JR., Must Respect be Earned?, in RESPECT, 
PLURALISM, AND JUSTICE, supra note 49, at 87, 103; Christine M. Korsgaard, Fellow 
Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals, in 25 THE TANNER LECTURES ON 
HUMAN VALUES 77 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 2005); Onora O’Neill, Kant on Duties Regarding 
Nonrational Nature, 72 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 211 (1998); Allen W. Wood, Kant on 
Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature, 72 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 189 (1998).  
 259  “[V]iolation of paternalistic laws (such as safety helmet requirements) or moralistic 
laws (e.g., the prohibition of the sale and use of contraceptives) does not benefit the offender 
to the detriment of someone else. This, generally, applies to all so-called ‘victimless crimes.’” 
Wojciech Sadurski, Social Justice and the Problem of Punishment, 25 ISR. L. REV. 302, 327 
(1991). Other examples include laws relating to prostitution, pornography, gambling, and 
recreational drugs 
 260  See supra note 237.  
 261  “[I]f we did accept that drivers might put others at a risk of threats to their autonomy in 
driving too fast, then it is not the case that all instances of speeding pose such risks as 
sometimes speed limits are set to conserve energy, not to increase safety.” Thom Brooks, 
Autonomy, Freedom, and Punishment, 2 LEGAL THEORY CHINA 161, 165 (2011). Once, 
however, a speed limit is in place, aroused expectations by others may generate wrongful risks 
to them.  
 262  See supra text accompanying note 242.  
 263  Dworkin puts dignity at the center of his “associative obligations”, such as those with 
respect to “my children, parents, lovers, friends, colleagues, and fellow citizens . . . .” 
DWORKIN, supra note 57, at 311. The answer to the question of why we have such obligations 
“lies, once again, in a creative interaction between our very general responsibility not to harm 
other people and the social practices that refine that responsibility . . . .” Id. Dworkin cautions 
against practices where “the dignity of the party denied that special concern is compromised.” 
Id. at 312.  
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Because each member of a social group is expected to follow the group’s norms, 
virtually by definition norms arouse reliance and expectations.264 Other types of 
maxims may also create or inform duties to observe norms, such as ones about truth 
telling and promise keeping, exploitation, and risk imposition. Norms are a result of 
maxims or are influenced by them. Norms are also a precursor of maxims and 
influence them. The core and penumbral meanings of many of the key terms in 
common maxims, both first- and second-order, are interpreted or established by a 
frame erected by norms. The terms “reasonable” and “foreseeable” are obvious 
examples. So are more foundational terms such as “respect”, “dignity”, and 
“balance”, as in “righting the imbalance” or “balancing liberty and security 
interests.”  
While maxims and norms are often closely linked,265 they do not have to be. A 
justifiable, adopted maxim may not align with norms, as where one commits to a 
higher level of reciprocity or safety precautions than required by social practices. Via 
meta-norms and maxims, particularly those relating to reliance and expectations, 
existing lower level norms may be overturned as new or modified practices become 
more common or insistent.266 There may be an ebb and flow as values and practices 
change with the times. Evolving norms regarding sexual conduct between consenting 
adults provide examples. Some norms specifically rely upon meta-norms as 
standards. The right of privacy, for instance, is delineated by a sphere of reasonable 
expectations.267 
The deontic force of consent, which is often reinforced or grounded by truth 
telling and promise keeping, reliance and expectations, and other maxims, may 
                                                            
 264  In a famous case, Judge Traynor protected reliance on a stop sign placed pursuant to an 
invalid statute. “If a through artery has been posted with stop signs by the public authorities in 
the customary way and to all appearances by regular procedure, any reasonable man should 
know that the public naturally relies upon their observance.” Clinkscales v. Carver, 136 P.2d 
777, 778-79 (Cal. 1943). “Custom also bears upon what others will expect the actor to do, and 
what, therefore, reasonable care may require the actor to do, upon the feasibility of taking 
precautions, the difficulty of change, and the actor’s opportunity to learn the risks and what is 
called for to meet them.” PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 60, at 193 (citation omitted). 
“Custom . . . draws its support from two sources – due care doctrine’s quest for salient 
precautions, and the principle that reasonable reliance should not be disappointed.” Keating, 
supra note 31, at 64.  
 265  “Legal norms fix our social expectations, and through that alter what counts as justified 
wrongdoing and unjustified wrongdoing.” VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 268 
(2005). Contrariwise, as Tadros sees it, sufficiently unjust social norms, such as unfair tax 
laws, may justify refusal to obey when the reasons for disobedience outweigh the reasons for 
obedience. See id. at 268-69.  
 266  “[S]ocial norms do and should evolve; deviation from a norm is one way of changing 
it, perhaps in a beneficial way. Overly rigid enforcement of norms might lead to social 
ossification.” Smith, supra note 96, at 780 (citation omitted).  
 267  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (imposing liability for 
publication of information “of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public”). “I shall argue that whether an 
expectation of privacy is reasonable depends on our social practices and norms.” TUNICK, 
supra note 128, at 139. But in the words of Justice Harlan: “Since it is the task of the law to 
form and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the 
expectations and risks [aroused by social practices] without examining the desirability of 
saddling them upon society.” United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971).  
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incorporate norms of a wide assortment, as where one consents to obey the laws of 
the state.268 There are limits to incorporation even by explicit consent, however, 
since once again, the norms must survive the deontic filter.  
In sum, for norms that are not directly based on deontic maxims (e.g., drive on 
the right), the categorical imperative allows for a variety of possible norms, a group 
selects one of them, and consent, reliance and expectations, and other types of 
maxims, deontically effectuate the selection.269 Rawls refers to the “categorical 
imperative procedure” as a means of Kantian constructivism of a set of moral 
norms.270 Not to be forgotten, however, is that under the individualistic analysis of 
this Article, a major problem remains: While norms satisfying the categorical 
imperative may be selected by groups, each individual member must somehow 
consent to them, or she must herself adopt a reliance and expectation or other maxim 
that makes the norms obligatory to her. Most likely, in reality, society strong-arms 
her. 271 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this Article is to survey the terrain that an autonomous agent in a 
deontic regime must navigate to properly delineate her realm of freedom. Prudently 
balancing the agent’s liberty and security interests, and those of everyone else under 
the universalization principle, she embraces a complete and coherent set of 
substantive maxims and, should these be violated, interrelated requital maxims. For 
the requitals, corrective justice reigns in the private sphere and retribution in the 
public, criminal one. The contestable notions of harm, wrongfulness, and 
blameworthiness, and other associated moral concepts, must be adequately specified 
to insure this endeavor produces a workable scheme. In fully mapping her autonomy 
space, the agent will certainly consider morally loaded issues relating to intentional 
harmful conduct, truth telling and promise keeping, reliance and expectations, 
exploitation, risk imposition, and, in general, established norms. We wish her great 
                                                            
 268  “Making a false promise does victimize the promisee, but a more persuasive 
explanation than Kant gives for why it does so is that it frustrates expectations arising from a 
social practice.” TUNICK, supra note 128, at 193. “[T]he promise principle dictates an 
obligation only when a promise was not extracted through coercion or bad faith, but to decide 
what counts as undue coercion or a lacking good faith, we may need to appeal to convention.” 
Id. at 194 (invoking Atiyah, without citation).  
 269  For example, physical contact, such as hugging or kissing non-kin, may be proscribed 
by norms in one group (i.e., considered autonomy invasions), while customary in another, 
both norms being consistent with the categorical imperative. On implicit social conventions, 
see EDWARD T. HALL, THE SILENT LANGUAGE (1959). Similarly, under Korsgaard’s Kantian 
“Constitutional Model”, “[i]nclination presents the proposal; reason decides whether to act on 
it or not, and the decision takes the form of a legislative act.” CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF AGENCY 110 (2008). Might there be a second-order issue here: reliance and 
expectations on reliance and expectations norms?  
 270  See JOHN RAWLS, Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, in COLLECTED PAPERS, supra 
note 15, at 497; see also JOHN RAWLS, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, in 
COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 15, at 303; RAWLS, supra note 231, at 235-52 (“Moral 
Constructivism”).  
 271  “The morally authentic person, then, is severely limited in his choice of moral 
principles, and in respect to general rules that derive from social practices, it seems fair to say 
that he has scarcely any choice at all.” FEINBERG, supra note 183, at 38.  
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wisdom in this endeavor, for her task entails the determination of the domain of 
freedom for all of us.  
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